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Volume 9 Spring 1992 Number 2
Judicial Scrutiny of Expert Testimony in
Environmental Tort Litigation
Alani Golanski*
I. Introduction
A currently heated issue debated primarily in environ-
mental tort litigation concerns the extent to which courts
should scrutinize proffered expert testimony in determining
the admissibility of such evidence. This determination, which
arises under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or analogous state
evidentiary law principles, is frequently outcome determina-
tive because a party's proof on a material element will often
consist solely of the expert testimony at issue. Further, where
a cutting edge environmental tort case is at stake, involving a
substance newly alleged to be toxic, the viability of an entire
line of cases may hinge upon the Rule 703 determination.
This article begins by reviewing the split in authority regard-
ing the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of expert testi-
mony. After then examining a particular controversy arising
recently in asbestos litigation, the article ultimately suggests a
* The author is associated with the law firm of Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, New
York City, and is a member of the Bars of the States of New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut. Levy Phillips & Konigsberg is serving as plaintiffs' counsel in several
environmental tort cases, including the Joint Eastern District and Southern District
of New York federal asbestos litigation, the City of Boston and City of Baltimore
asbestos property damage litigation, and the nuclear waste personal injury litigation
in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of Levy Phillips & Konigsberg.
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standard and method of analysis that may best comport with
the greater scheme underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence.
By way of explanation, one "liberal" line of cases holds
that expert opinion testimony is admissible if the expert is
generally qualified in his field, if there is some factual basis
for his opinion, and if the facts or data underlying his meth-
odology meet a threshold criterion of reliability.1 Another "re-
strictive" line of cases stands for the proposition that trial
judges should proceed further and independently scrutinize
the quality and appropriateness of the expert's data, method-
ology, and conclusions to determine whether these are actu-
ally reliable.2
Although such case law, for the most part, deals with the
standard to be applied to the admissibility of testimony by
experts regarding causation in fact in the toxic tort setting,
courts face the same question of how strictly to scrutinize an
expert's methodology and underlying data in respect to a vari-
ety of issues. Increasingly, expert economic testimony has
been called upon in attempting to resolve liability issues in
complex tort cases involving massive environmental and per-
sonal injuries. In particular, courts and litigants have relied
upon market share analyses in seeking to apportion responsi-
bility. This approach is most closely associated with the so-
called "DES" litigation, but has also recently appeared in as-
bestos litigation, which currently commands unparalleled at-
tention upon the dockets of federal and state courts across the
nation.
After examining one court's evaluation of proffered mar-
ket share testimony in asbestos litigation, this article ulti-
mately concludes that the liberal approach to the level of judi-
cial scrutiny comports with the spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and ensures greater consistency and scrutability of
judicial analysis on the issue of admissibility. While perhaps
posing more of an intellectual challenge for courts, the restric-
tive approach has engendered a hodgepodge of standards that
often reduce to a substitution of the court's judgment on sci-
1. See infra notes 18-114 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 115-63.
[Vol. 9
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
entific or technical matters for that of the expert. Accordingly,
this article supports that level of scrutiny whereby proffered
expert testimony is presumed admissible, pursuant to Rules
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, if the expert
witness is generally qualified in his field, if his opinion testi-
mony derives from his specific field of expertise, if there is
some factual basis for the testimony, and if the underlying
data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field.'
Yet this article argues that satisfaction of the liberal stan-
dard results only in a rebuttable presumption, and not a guar-
antee, of admissibility of the challenged evidence. This pre-
sumption may be overcome upon demonstrating, under Rule
403, that the probative value of the proposed testimony is
"substantially outweighed" by the danger of confusion of the
issues or misleading the jury.4 This danger must permeate the
proffered evidence and inhere in misleading or flawed assump-
tions that systematically favor a particular result and that are
substantially likely to thwart the jury's understanding or de-
termination of a fact in issue. However, the balance under
Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admission.'
Consequently, the standard proposed in this article is, in
effect, an intermediate standard because it does entail a sec-
ond level of scrutiny of proffered expert testimony. However,
the ability ultimately to exclude such evidence is limited. Un-
like the restrictive approach, this independent judicial exami-
nation occurs in the context of the Rule 403 standard, and
does not gauge reliability under Rule 703. Accordingly, under
this intermediate standard, expert testimony that satisfies-the
liberal interpretation of Rule 703 and, when viewed as a sys-
tem of assumptions, is not substantially likely to confuse the
issues or mislead the jury, will be admitted, even if such testi-
mony does not fulfill the court's particular standard of
reliability.
3. See FED. R. Evm. 702 & 703. As will be shown, it is the expert himself who
may be in the best position to make the latter determination.
4. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
5. See United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 585 (11th Cir. 1987).
1992]
3
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
II. Overview of Judicial Approaches to Expert Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides -that:
[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those per-
ceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence."
The facts or data relied upon by experts under Rule 703
may be derived from three possible sources. First, an expert
may base his opinion on firsthand observation. The treating
physician is the paradigmatic expert illustrating reliance upon
firsthand information. 7 Second, a source of expert opinion
may be the evidentiary presentation at trial. "The technique
may be the familiar hypothetical question or having the ex-
pert attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the
facts. Problems of determining what testimony the expert re-
lied upon, when the latter technique is employed and the tes-
timony is in conflict, may be resolved by resort to [Federal
Rule of Evidence] 705.''8 Third, data reviewed by the expert
outside of court and acquired other than by his own percep-
tion may also be relied upon by an expert.
6. FED. R. EVID. 703.
7. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV.
473, 489 (1962). Whether such an expert must first relate his observations is treated
in Federal Rule of Evidence 705, which provides that "[tihe expert may testify in
terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED.
R. EVID. 705.
8. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283. Under com-
mon law tradition, the bases of an expert's opinion were restricted to these two
sources, personal knowledge or knowledge gained at .trial. These common law bases
remain permissible under Rule 703, but this Rule adds the third source: data re-
viewed by the expert outside of court, and acquired other than by his own perception.
See generally 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE $
703[01], at 703-04 (1991); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1313, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
[Vol. 9
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This article will concern the third source of the data un-
derlying expert testimony. "In this respect the rule is
designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that
current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial prac-
tice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when
not in court."9 It is clear that Rule 703 "allows an expert to
base his opinion on information made known to him outside
the court and obtained through other than his own percep-
tion, whether admissible or not."10
9. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numer-
ous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and rela-
tives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital
records, and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the ex-
penditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating wit-
nesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His vali-
dation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes.
Id.; Rheingold, supra note 7, at 531; EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE § 15 (3d ed. 1984)[hereinafter CLEARY].
10. See PAUL LIACos, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 125 (5th ed. 1981).
The prescription of Rule 703 "grew out of an exception to the hearsay rule which had
been employed in a number of jurisdictions." Zenith Radio Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1313,
1322 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(quoting United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972)):
Expert witness testimony is a widely recognized exception to the rule against
hearsay testimony. It has long been the rule of evidence in the federal courts
that an expert witness can express an opinion as to value even though his
opinion is based in part or solely upon hearsay sources .... The rationale for
this exception to the rule against hearsay is that the expert, because of his
professional knowledge and ability, is competent to judge for himself the reli-
ability of the records and statements on which he bases his expert opinion.
Moreover, the opinion of expert witnesses must invariably rest, at least in
part, upon sources that can never be proven in court. An expert's opinion is
derived not only from records and data, but from education and from a life-
time of experience. Thus, when the expert witness has consulted numerous
sources, and uses that information, together with his own professional knowl-
edge and experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evi-
dence in its own right and not as hearsay in disguise.
Id.; see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 35 F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913); see
generally Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 963 (1965); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (hearsay
exception permitting physician to testify based in part upon information received
from nurses, patients, and various medical specialists); United States v. 1,516.90
Acres of Land, 405 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969); United
5
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A. Determinations of Causation in Fact in Toxic Tort Cases
The split in authority over what standard should be ap-
plied by courts in evaluating the admissibility of proffered ex-
pert testimony under Rule 703 has been most pronounced
when such testimony has concerned causation in fact in cases
involving injuries allegedly caused by toxic chemicals and sub-
stances. Because scientific research with respect to any partic-
ular toxic substance is often spurred 'by, hence subsequent to,
the first attempts at litigation, scientific opinions at such early
stages are often amorphous and unresolved, sometimes ill-
researched and occasionally tailored to the needs of the pay-
ing client." Consequently, some courts have reasonably felt
the burden of examining proposed scientific testimony to en-
sure that juries will be presented only with reliable evidence.
On the other hand, other courts have recognized that,
when questions regarding the injurious consequences of toxic
substances stand at the frontier of current medical and epide-
miological inquiry, experts who are willing to do so should be
allowed to testify regarding their opinions on the links be-
tween such substances and particular diseases, and it is for
the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony. That an-
other jury might reach the opposite conclusion or that science
would require more evidence before conclusively considering
the causation question resolved has been considered by such
courts irrelevant to the issue of legal sufficiency.
Thus, while it is hornbook law that it is the role of the
court to determine whether expert testimony has a sufficient
foundation," this role is counterbalanced by the principle that
States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966) (hearsay information in-
volving land valuation based upon comparable sales); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) (expert testimony on valua-
tion of businesses based upon diverse background sources, including accounting
data).
11. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. U.S., A Half-Century Later, 80 COL. L. REV. 1197 (1980)[hereinafter
Novel Scientific Evidence].
12. See generally In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 275-
78 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); McKiernan v. Caldor,
Inc., 438 A.2d 865 (Conn. 1981); Moore, Kelly & Reddish, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc.,
165 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1968); Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967);
[Vol. 9
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"a court should accord 'proper deference to the jury's role as
the arbiter of disputes between conflicting opinions.' ,,13
In his opinion in Agent Orange,"' Judge Jack B. Wein-
stein explained the resulting divergent approaches to Rule
703:
[T]he courts have adopted two general approaches [in de-
termining] the adequacy and reliability of the basis and
sources of an expert's opinion [under] . . . Rule 703: one
restrictive, one liberal .... The more restrictive view re-
quires the trial court to determine not only whether the
data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field, but also whether the underlying data are un-
trustworthy for hearsay or other reasons. The more liberal
view allows the expert to base an opinion on data of the
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field with-
out separately determining the trustworthiness of the
particular data involved.'"
The liberal approach discussed by Judge Weinstein rests
principally upon the conviction that "[p]ublic policy dictates
that both science and law strive to recognize the causal nexus
Allan H. McCoid, Opinion Evidence and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 356,
362-63 (1955).
13. Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987))[hereinafter
Christophersen I].
14. The Agent Orange controversy resulted in voluminous litigation which was
litigated before Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York. For conve-
nience the cases were consolidated and are all reported under the case name, In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation. In order to distinguish between cases,
this article will refer to them as follows:
Agent Orange I, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
Agent Orange II, 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange IV, 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange V, 611 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange VI, 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange VII, 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange VIII, 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
Agent Orange IX, 603 F. Supp. 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
15. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afJ'd, 818
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
1992]
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between a toxic substance and injury at the earliest possible
stage in order to protect the health and well-being of the pub-
lic at large."' 6 The restrictive approach, on the other hand,
seeks to filter out and keep away from the jury data deter-
mined to be unreliable, but which has the aura of trustworthi-
ness simply because it is offered by an expert. Those courts
adopting the restrictive interpretation of Rule 703 have sub-
jected "the assumptions which form the basis for the expert's
opinion, as well as the conclusions drawn therefrom . . . , to
rigorous examination.""
1. The Liberal Approach
Three cases are most often cited as illustrative of the lib-
eral approach to deciding the admissibility of expert opinion
testimony: Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 8 , Wells v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.9 , and the first of two decisions by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Christophersen v.
Allied-Signal Corp.0 In these cases, this evidentiary issue was
resolved through examination of the facts or data underlying
the proffered expert opinion only to the extent necessary to
make a Rule 703 determination on whether they are of the
16. Christopher M. Placitella, Toxic-Tort Litigation Shapes New Expert-Wit-
ness Role, N.J.L.J., Sept. 20, 1990, at 81 and at 95.
17. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). "The restrictive interpreta-
tion of Rule 703 is uniformly advocated by industry in an effort to eliminate as many
claims as possible and has found acceptance in some courts, particularly in drug
cases." Placitella, supra note 16, at 93; see, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897
F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307
(5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d
1190 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'g 646 F. Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986); Turpin v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1990); Thomas v. Hoffman-La
Roche, 731 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Hull v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
700 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. 1223; In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
18. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
19. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
20. 902 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1990); See supra note 13.
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type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. The analy-
sis of these courts, in following the liberal approach, did not
include a separate determination regarding the trustworthi-
ness of the particular data involved, for such an assessment is
left for the factfinder. An explication of these cases should
clarify the roots, policy considerations, and applications of the
liberal approach.
a. Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., the estate of Rich-
ard Ferebee, who had been an agricultural worker, claimed
that its decedent had "contracted pulmonary fibrosis as a re-
sult of long-term skin exposure to dilute solutions of para-
quat, a herbicide distributed in the United States solely by
defendant Chevron."2 The plaintiff's theory of the case was
that Chevron's failure to label paraquat in a manner that ade-
quately informed ultimate users that long-term skin exposure
to its product could cause serious lung disease made Chevron
strictly liable for the injuries of the decedent.2
When the jury returned a wrongful death verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, Chevron argued on appeal, inter alia, that the
jury's finding that Richard Ferebee's exposure to paraquat
had caused his chronic lung inflammation and death was not
supported by sufficient evidence. The District of Columbia
Circuit panel rejected Chevron's argument, noting that two
expert witnesses had refuted this argument, and that the jury
was entitled to believe those experts.23 This refutation had
primarily consisted of the conclusions proffered by the expert
witnesses, who were "eminent specialists in pulmonary
medicine," that paraquat poisoning was the cause of Ferebee's
illness and death.24 In support of his conclusion, one of the
experts had further identified three other cases he felt were
similar to that of the decedent.2 5
21. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1531-32.
22. Id. at 1532-33.
23. Id. at 1535.
24. Id.
25. Id.
1992]
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At trial Chevron had introduced its own experts, who
stated that Ferebee's illness had not been caused by paraquat.
Nevertheless, according to the District of Columbia Circuit,
the experts on both sides had relied on essentially the same
diagnostic methodology, differing solely on the conclusions
they drew.2" The Ferebee court stated that "[t]he case was
thus a classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury
must decide the victor. '27
Seeking battle on a different field, Chevron asserted the
rule that expert opinion testimony must be generally accepted
in the scientific community before it can be introduced as evi-
dence. Chevron argued that the views of plaintiffs' experts,
while not rejected by the scientific community, were still too
novel to be admissible.2 8
The court in Ferebee disagreed, opining that any such ar-
gument based on novelty could prevail only if the scientific
techniques and methodologies, and not merely the scientific
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
28. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535. Chevron cited the case of Reed v. State, wherein
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that, "before a scientific opinion will be received
as evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted
as reliable within the expert's particular field." Reed, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1968). A
special rule for scientific evidence was first applied in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), wherein the District of Columbia Circuit Court stated that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014; see generally Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952); Boeche v.
State, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Neb. 1949); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495, 502-05
(Okla. Crim. App. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1952). Professor McCormick has
detailed the erosion and rejection of the Frye standard in his treatise, noting that:
[t]he adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence has only intensified this process.
These rules do not explicitly distinguish between scientific and other forms of expert
testimony, and they permit experts to rely on facts or data not otherwise admissible
into evidence as long as they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in [the] particu-
lar field."
CLEARY, supra note 9, § 203, at 607. Professor McCormick concludes that, "[p]lainly,
'reasonable reliance' is not synonymous with general acceptance." Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
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opinions and conclusions, were themselves novel. Thus, as-
serted the court,
a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established
by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can
testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As
long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a
conclusion is sound, such as use of tissue samples, stan-
dard tests, and patient examination, products liability law
does not preclude recovery until a "statistically signifi-
cant" number of people have been injured or until science
has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated
laboratory studies of the chemical.29
The court next set forth its rule that, "[iln a courtroom,
the test for-allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this
type is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency."30 Thus, in
the case before the court, if reasonable jurors could have con-
cluded from the expert testimony that paraquat more likely
than not caused Ferebee's injury, "the fact that another jury
might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would re-
quire more evidence before conclusively considering the cau-
sation question resolved is irrelevant.""
b. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
In Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,2 the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed a $5.1 million judgment in favor of plaintiffs
based on the severe birth defects of plaintiff Katie Wells.
These birth defects had allegedly resulted from her mother's
use, for approximately four weeks after conception, of a sper-
29. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535-36.
30. Id. at 1536; see also Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts:
Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scien-
tific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Pir. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989); Troyen A.
Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer
and Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 33
(1985).
31. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536.
32. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
1992]
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
micidal jelly manufactured by defendant Ortho.33
On appeal, Ortho argued that the "plaintiffs had failed to
prove causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. '34
Ortho contended that the scientific and medical studies intro-
duced by the plaintiff were inconclusive, and that the oral tes-
timony of the plaintiffs' experts was not based on opinions
with scientifically reliable foundations.3 5
The Wells court rejected Ortho's appellate contentions,
referring to the several epidemiological studies presented by
the plaintiffs "that indicated an association between spermi-
cide use and deleterious effects on the fetus." 36 The court
stated that, although the district court had indeed found the
various studies presented by each side to be inconclusive, a
clear causal relationship need not be established as a requisite
to the admissibility of expert opinion that such a relationship
exists.37 Instead, the court relied upon Ferebee in labeling the
conflicts in the studies presented by each side a "'battle of
the experts.' "38
The Wells court concluded that the plaintiffs' burden on
the issue of causation " 'did not necessarily require them to
produce scientific studies showing a statistically significant as-
sociation between spermicide and congenital malformations in
a large population.' ,,39 Rather, "a distinction exists between
legal sufficiency and scientific certainty .... ,,o "[I]t does not
33. Id. at 742-43. This case was tried by the district court after the parties
waived a jury. Id. at 743. Consequently, in the appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit examined the district court's factual findings under the clearly erro-
neous standard. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 572 (1985); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969).
34. Wells, 788 F.2d at 743 (citing Robinson v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 611 F.2d 604,
608 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980); Parrott v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 243 S.E.2d 269, 270
(Ga. App. 1978)).
35. Wells, 788 F.2d at 744.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 745 (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
38. Id. (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535).
39. Id. at 745 (quoting the district court opinion, Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 292 (N.D. Ga. 1985)).
40. Id. (citing Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536).
[Vol. 9
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matter in terms of deciding the case that the medical commu-
nity might require more research and evidence before conclu-
sively resolving the question. What matters is that this partic-
ular factfinder found sufficient evidence of causation in a legal
sense in this particular case, and that that finding is not
clearly erroneous."'41
c. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.
In perhaps the most salient explication of the liberal ap-
proach, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its first
decision in the case of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp.,42 set forth certain policy considerations underlying that
approach. A detailed review of the Christophersen case may
further reveal, in practical terms, the way in which the liberal
and restrictive approaches conflict, for in that case the Court
of Appeals analyzed and, upon its initial review, overturned
the restrictive scrutiny practiced by the district court.
In Christophersen, the decedent, Albert Roy Christopher-
sen, had worked for the Marathon Manufacturing Company
at its plant in Waco, Texas, where the company produced
nickel/cadmium batteries. Although he was never directly in-
volved in the production of these batteries, Christophersen
was required by the job to visit that part of the plant in which
the batteries were manufactured. During these visits, Chris-
tophersen was exposed to the fumes containing particles of
nickel and cadmium that were spewed in the manufacturing
process.43
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the dece-
dent's exposure to these fumes caused the cancer that led to
his death. When the defendants moved for summary judg-
41. Id. Perhaps in circumlocutious fashion, the Eleventh Circuit, as well as the
district court, stated in Wells that the standard of legal sufficiency is met when the
plaintiff has shown causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Id. (citing
Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 295); see Parrott v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 243 S.E.2d
269, 271 (Ga. App. 1978); Robertson v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 611 F.2d 604, 608 n.13
(5th Cir. 1980); Watson v. United States, 346 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 976 (1966).
42. Christophersen I, supra note 13.
43. Id. at 363.
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ment, the district court examined the proposed testimony of
the plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Lawrence Miller, who had
concluded that Christophersen's exposure to nickel and cad-
mium at Marathon caused his disease and death. Evidently an
adherent of the restrictive approach to the evaluation of pro-
posed expert testimony, the district court "undertook an in-
depth review of the bases for [the expert's] conclusion and de-
termined that his opinion should be excluded."'4 The district
court based its decision to exclude the causation evidence on
its determination that Dr. Miller's conclusion was unreliable. 5
i. The First Christophersen Opinion
In its first review of the district court's ruling, the Fifth
Circuit Court in Christophersen I sought to determine
whether such ruling had been manifestly erroneous. 6 Guiding
the court's review regarding the admissibility of expert testi-
mony, however, was its commitment to the principle that a
court should accord " 'proper deference to the jury's role as
the arbiter of disputes between conflicting opinions. As a gen-
eral rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an ex-
pert's opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion
rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury's
consideration.' ",47 Thus, stated the Christophersen I panel, "a
court should exclude an expert opinion only if it is 'funda-
mentally unsupported' and 'would not actually assist the jury
in arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict.'""
The court in Christophersen I then proceeded to examine
the proffered expert testimony, as well as the district court's
method of analysis leading to the exclusion of such testimony.
The court first noted that, in an affidavit submitted to the
44. Id. at 364.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir.
1988); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).
47. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 364 (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422);
see also Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that once a witness is "properly admitted as an expert, the jury [is] at liberty to
accept or reject his testimony, and to judge his credibility").
48. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 364 (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422).
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district court, Dr. Miller had reached the following conclusion:
Based upon my review of the medical records, re-
search literature, my education and experience, it is my
opinion that, more likely than not, the metastatic cancer
which caused the death of Mr. Christophersen was caused
by his exposure to toxic nickel and cadmium fumes dur-
ing his lifetime. I have reached this opinion after con-
ducting extensive research and investigation into this
matter and my opinion is based upon reasonable medical
probability."9
The Fifth Circuit next noted that the district court, in its
memorandum opinion, had focused its analysis on three types
of information that Dr. Miller had relied on in forming his
conclusions. The first of these was evidence of exposure. Most
of the information that Dr. Miller had received regarding
Christophersen's exposure to nickel and cadmium came from
the affidavit of a former employee at Marathon's Waco plant.
This affidavit indicated that over a fourteen-year period
Christophersen's duties required him regularly to visit areas
of the Marathon plant in which he was exposed to "'many
fumes and gases,' including 'airborne particles of cadmium
and nickel alloys.' "" Dr. Miller had relied on these state-
ments and other information from plaintiffs' counsel in con-
cluding that Christophersen's employment history at Mara-
thon "'included extensive exposure to nickel and cadmium
fumes.' 51
The district court, however, closely scrutinized Dr.
Miller's analysis, and "took issue with [his] conclusion, ' 52
"primarily because there was no indication of the chemical
composition of the fumes in the plant or the level of expo-
sure."'53 Accordingly, the district court found that " 'Dr. Miller
49. Id. at 365.
50. Id. (quoting affidavit of Edgar G. Manoliu, a former employee at Marathon's
Waco plant).
51. Id. (quoting affidavit submitted to the district court by Dr. Lawrence Miller).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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could not base a reliable opinion solely upon the information
provided in the [former employee's] affidavit.'""
The Fifth Circuit agreed that "evidence concerning the
chemical composition of the fumes in the Marathon plant and
the level of exposure would [have been] helpful,"55 but held
that the district court had erred in determining that "the ab-
sence of such information rendered Dr. Miller's opinion unre-
liable." 56 The court stated that the expert "was entitled to
rely on the information provided him in formulating his opin-
ions ... ,and he apparently determined that the information
was sufficient to allow him to make a finding."57 The Chris-
tophersen I court continued that, at trial, the defendants
would be able to "challenge the factual basis for Dr. Miller's
conclusions and argue that additional information was neces-
sary in order to make an accurate finding on causation, but
these arguments go to the weight to be accorded Dr. Miller's
opinion and not to its admissibility."5 8
The second type of information that the expert relied on
in forming his conclusions was the "pathogenesis of small cell
carcinoma." 59 "Christophersen's medical and autopsy records
indicat[ed] that he [had] died as the result of small cell carci-
noma of the colon that metastasized to his liver." 60 "In his
deposition, Dr. Miller [had] testified that small cell carcinoma
is an unusual form of cancer that has been linked to changes
in the genetic material in cells caused by exposure to toxic
substances." ' "When these altered cells replicate, the result-
ing or daughter cells may retain the genetic alteration and be-
come cancerous." 62 Dr. Miller had indicated an association be-
tween that small cell carcinoma in the lung and nickel and
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).
58. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 365.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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cadmium exposure.63 He had further suggested that, "'[b]ased
on what's known about the biochemical nature of small-cell'
carcinoma, 'the same sorts of chemicals and exposures that
are associated with small-cell carcinoma of the lung are likely
to be associated with small-cell carcinoma elsewhere in the
body.' "64
"The district court again took issue with the basis of Dr.
Miller's analysis," 65 and stated that he had "'present[ed] no
authority for his opinion that a primary small cell cancer of
the colon has the same pathogenesis as a primary small cell
cancer of the lung simply because their appearance is simi-
lar.' "66 The Fifth Circuit found that such characterization of
the testimony distorted Dr. Miller's analysis, and that the ex-
pert had -in fact engaged in a "more sophisticated line of
reasoning. '"67
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did acknowledge that
the record contained the affidavits of several physicians who
were critical of Dr. Miller's conclusions.6 8 These "affidavits
primarily address[ed] the need for epidemiological and animal
studies specifically linking nickel and cadmium exposure to
colon cancer." 69 One defense expert concluded, for instance,
that "'Dr. Miller's presumption that nickel and cadmium
have been associated with a certain type of cell in lung cancer
and therefore should be associated with a similar type of cell
in the colon has no support in medical science and is without
foundation.' "170 Another expert had opined that Dr. Miller's
analysis was "'without basis in fact and has no scientific
merit.' "71
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit stated that such compet-
ing expert testimony "create[d] at best a conflict between ex-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 366.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting the affidavit of Dr. Sherwood Gorbach).
71. Id. (quoting the affidavit of Dr. Richard Rudders).
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perts. ' '72 The Christophersen I court then rebuked the district
court for having relied upon the "conclusory statements" of
the defense experts and upon "its own interpretation of the
testimony" in calling Dr. Miller's analysis " 'not scientifically
correct.' "' In a revealing assessment, the appellate panel
concluded that, "[i]n so holding, the court, on the basis of affi-
davits and thus without the benefit of development of the
opinions through cross-examination, simply chose sides in this
battle of the experts and thereby usurped the role of the jury
in evaluating the evidence and the credibility of expert
witnesses. 74
The third and final type of information that the expert
relied on in forming his conclusions was the medical litera-
ture. Relying upon the affidavits submitted by the defense ex-
perts, "the district court [had] concluded that Dr. Miller's
opinion was inadmissible because it was not based on epide-
miological, animal, or in vitro studies showing a statistically
significant link between colon cancer and exposure to nickel
and/or cadmium.''75
While conceding "that he was not aware of any articles or
studies specifically linking nickel and cadmium exposure to
small cell cancer of the colon, '"" Dr. Miller nevertheless had
stated that, "based upon a more likely than not standard, he
could conclude"' "7 from the state of medical knowledge "that
Christophersen's exposure to nickel and cadmium at Mara-
thon [had] caused his cancer." 8 "In support of his conclu-
sions, Dr. Miller noted that nickel and cadmium are known to
be carcinogenic in humans."79 He further took "into consider-
ation the duration of Christophersen's exposure to nickel and
cadmium,"80 as well as "the absence of evidence of exposure
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 366-67.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 367.
80. Id.
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to other potentially carcinogenic substances such as asbestos
or alcohol."81
The Christophersen I court asserted that Dr. Miller's
analysis had incorporated "methodologies that physicians tra-
ditionally rely on in diagnosing the cause of a particular pa-
tient's cancer.""2 According to the Fifth Circuit, the district
court "should have permitted plaintiffs to present their causa-
tion evidence to the jury, which could then 'determine the ap-
propriate weight to be given to the testimony.' ",83 The court
noted that it is not necessary that "the proof or expert testi-
mony concerning causation in toxic tort cases be supported by
epidemiological studies establishing a cause-effect
relationship. 84
The court in Christophersen I remarked that a toxic tort
plaintiff is not limited to any one method for establishing cau-
sation. It restated the ruling in Ferebee that "the test for al-
lowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit ... is not scientific
certainty but legal sufficiency. "85 The court additionally
stated that it was simply applying its own traditional position
that "'[a]n expert's opinion need not be generally accepted in
the scientific community before it can be sufficiently reliable
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988)).
83. Id. at 367 (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238,
278 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Osburn, 825
F.2d at 915 (holding that "medical expert opinion testimony that is controversial in
its conclusions can support a jury finding of causation as long as the doctor's con-
clusory opinion is based upon well-founded methodologies")).
84. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 367 (citing City of Greenville v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 980 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984)). The Christophersen I Court then noted that "the exception from this
rule is this court's recent holding that absent statistically significant epidemiological
proof that the drug Bendectin is a human teratogen, a plaintiff's proof that the drug
caused her child's birth defects was insufficient." 902 F.2d at 367 (citing Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d
166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1046 (1990)). The Brock Court, however,
specifically declined to hold that "epidemiologic proof is a necessary element in all
toxic tort cases." 874 F.2d at 313.
85. Christophersen I supra note 13, at 367 (citing Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536).
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and probative' to be submitted to the jury and perhaps sup-
port a jury finding." '86
In conclusion, the Christophersen I court held, at least
initially, that Dr. Miller's analysis had not been "so 'funda-
mentally unsupported' that [it] would be of no assistance to
the jury in reaching a verdict. '87 The questions "defendants
raise concerning the bases for the conclusions are issues prop-
erly presented to and considered by the jury, but they do not
render the opinion unreliable and therefore inadmissible."88
ii. Opinion of the En Banc Panel
The Fifth Circuit in Christophersen H subsequently
granted defendants' petition for rehearing en banc.8 9 The
court reiterated that "a trial court's ruling regarding admissi-
bility of expert testimony is 'protected by an ambit of discre-
tion and must be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.' "90
In its effort to guide district courts in their approach to prof-
fered expert testimony, the court set forth a four step analysis
to be followed."1
First, the court must determine "whether the witness is
qualified to express an expert opinion"9 pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. Second, a Rule 703 inquiry must focus
upon whether the facts relied upon are of "the same type as
those relied upon by other experts in the field."'9 3 Third,
under Frye v. United States,9' the court must determine
whether the expert, in reaching his conclusion, used a "well-
founded methodology." 95 And fourth, assuming that the ex-
pert's testimony has passed muster under the Rule 702, Rule
86. Id. (quoting Osburn, 825 F.2d at 915).
87. Id., 902 F.2d at 367.
88. Id.
89. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Christophersen II].
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1110.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95. Id.
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703 and Frye tests, it must be determined whether, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the proposed "testimony's po-
tential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its proba-
tive value.""'
Applying such analysis in review of the district court's ex-
clusion of Dr. Miller's proffered testimony, the court first
found that, although certain aspects of this witness's qualifi-
cations may have been suspect, this Rule 702 consideration
had not been the basis for the district court's disallowance of
the testimony.
The Christophersen II court did now hold, however, that
the district court had not abused its discretion in precluding
Dr. Miller's testimony on Rule 703 and Frye grounds. The
court recollected that, as stated, most of the information that
Dr. Miller had received regarding Christophersen's exposure
to nickel and cadmium came from the affidavit of a former
employee at Marathon's Waco plant.97 The court now found
reasonable the district court's criticism that this affidavit was
"inaccurate and incomplete."" "Particularly telling," said the
court, was the affiant's concession "that he did not know the
chemical composition of the fumes [or] the mix of chemicals
in the impregnation and soak tanks."' 9
The court further stated that Dr. Miller had not always
relied upon the accurate data contained in the affidavit.'00 For
instance, while the affidavit had correctly indicated that
Christophersen worked at the Waco plant for fourteen years
before his death, Dr. Miller based his opinion on the assump-
tion of a twenty-year work period.'
Further, in respect to the Frye inquiry, the court noted
that Dr. Miller had stated that "the kinds of evidence most
often used to establish causation are human epidemiological
studies, live animal testing, and in vitro testing."'0 ' The court
96. Christophersen II, supra note 89, at 1110.
97. Id at 1113.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1115.
1992]
21
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
held the district court to have been within its discretion in
finding it to be improperly inconsistent "for Dr. Miller, on the
one hand, to conclude that these are the main methodologies
and, on the other hand, to concede that he did not effectively
rely on any of them."'103 Instead, Dr. Miller had opined that
" 'the same sorts of chemicals and exposures . . . associated
with small-cell carcinoma of the lung are likely to be associ-
ated with small-cell carcinoma elsewhere in the body.' ""
The Christophersen II en banc panel did not explicitly
vitiate its language in the Christophersen I opinion that a
trial court must not simply chose sides in the battle of the
experts and thereby usurp the role of the jury in evaluating
the evidence and the credibility of expert witnesses. However,
it did appear to credit the district court's preference for the
conclusion of the defense expert, Dr. Sherwood Gorbach, over
that of Dr. Miller. Dr. Gorbach had opined that" 'Dr. Miller's
presumption that nickel and cadmium have been associated
with a certain type of cell in lung cancer and therefore should
be associated with a similar type of cell in the colon has no
support in medical science and is without foundation.' "10"
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Clark stated that
both the district court and the en banc majority had incor-
rectly interpreted and applied Rule 703.106 He felt, neverthe-
less, that the district court's exclusion of Dr. Miller's opinion
testimony was not manifest error under Rule 403, which al-
lows a court to exclude relevant evidence when "'its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.' 107 Chief Judge Clark stressed that "Rule 703 does
not authorize a court to approve or disapprove the expert's
conclusion.' 0 8 Because the district court had attempted to
determine whether experts in the field of cancer research
would have reasonably relied on the particular facts and data
used by Dr. Miller, Clark found its Rule 703 analysis im-
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 365-66).
105. Christophersen I, supra note 13 at 366.
106. Christophersen II, supra note 89, at 1117.
107. Id. at 1120.
108. Id. at 1118.
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proper.'0 9 "Rule 703 only asks the court to determine whether
experts in the field of cancer research would have reasonably
relied on facts or data of this 'type' in forming opinions or
inferences 'upon the subject' of cancer causation. ' '' 0
In dissent, Circuit Judge Reavley, joined by Circuit
Judges King, Johnson and Wiener, harked back to the first
Fifth Circuit opinion in Christophersen I. Accordingly, Judge
Reavley found unacceptable both the en banc -majority and
concurring analyses. Judge Reavly stated that the majority
opinion "effectively allows judges to decide the reliability,
weight, and relative merit of expert opinions, at least in toxic
tort cases."'"' He continued that such opinion "confuses the
admissibility of evidence with the sufficiency of evidence,
changes the rules of evidence without benefit of amendment,
denies Mrs. Christophersen her right to trial by jury, and
eliminates substantive rights in tort cases where federal courts
have only diversity jurisdiction."'"1 2
In respect to Judge Clark's application of Rule 403, the
dissent stated that, under such application, "[j]udges may
weigh contradictory evidence and exclude any proffered evi-
dence considered unreliable. The judge's opinion about the
contested evidence determines unreliability. The force of the
proffered evidence on the very point at issue becomes the
prejudice.""11 3 Noting that the "unfair prejudice" to which
Rule 403 refers is "an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis," the dissent then asked, "[w]hat is the im-
proper basis or prejudice here, unless a judge simply assumes
that Dr. Miller is wrong and the defendants' affiants are
right? That assumption has not been a predicate in the past
for Rule 403 exclusion.' 1 4
It seems apparent that the en banc determination in
Christophersen II has not clarified, but has muddied, any at-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1119.
111. Id. at 1122.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1135.
114. Id. (citing Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C. Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978)).
1992]
23
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
tempt at discerning the Fifth Circuit's current interpretation
of Rules 703 and 403, and the interrelated application of such
Rules. It is apparent that the Circuit is itself deeply divided
on the issue of the level and nature of judicial scrutiny of
proffered expert testimony that is appropriate under such
Rules.
2. The Restrictive Approach
As shown, the opinions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Christophersen 1 5 and Christophersen III6 reflect
the tension existing between the liberal and restrictive ap-
proaches. Interestingly, even in its first opinion which adopted
the liberal approach under Rule 703, the Fifth Circuit itself,
like the district court, had to undertake a somewhat rigorous
examination of the proposed expert testimony. Examining Dr.
Miller's analysis "of the biochemical reaction that results in
the development of small cell carcinoma,"" 7 the court was
able to conclude that "[t]he district court's simplistic charac-
terization has no relevance to this more sophisticated line of
reasoning."" 8 Thus, the Christophersen I panel, as well as the
dissenting members of the later en banc panel, were able to
return to their philosophical theme and conclude that the dis-
trict court had simply chosen sides in this battle of the ex-
perts, and had thereby usurped the role of the jury." 9
Plainly, both Christophersen cases, especially the first
appellate manifestation, reveal one of the dangers inherent
in a court's use of the restrictive approach. That is, the
possibility that a party will be deprived of critical and proper
expert testimony based upon the court's incorrect appraisal or
understanding of the expert's methodology. After all, when it
comes to the evaluation of scientific testimony, the court will
often stand in the shoes of a layperson. Yet the question re-
mains whether appellate review of such potentially flawed as-
115. 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990).
116. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
117. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 365-66.
118. Id. at 366.
119. Id. at 366; Christophersen II, supra note 89, at 1128-29.
[Vol. 9
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
sessment is preferable to an outright rejection of rigorous
scrutiny.
The restrictive approach, however, does have some posi-
tive aspects. The value of this approach can best be under-
stood by examining the views of courts adopting it. The lead-
ing opinions advocating and implementing a rigorous judicial
scrutiny of proposed expert testimony were those authored by
Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange product liability litiga-
tion.120 The Agent Orange lawsuits were brought by Vietnam
veterans and members of their families who alleged that the
veterans' exposure to Agent Orange, a herbicide manufactured
by the defendants, had caused serious health problems. 12 1 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that
the plaintiffs could not prove' that their injuries had been
caused by exposure to Agent Orange.12
The Agent Orange court determined that "all reliable
studies of the effect of Agent Orange on members of the class
so far published provide no support for plaintiffs' claims of
causation. ' 12 The court concluded that "[a] number of sound
epidemiological studies have been conducted on the health ef-
120. See supra note 14; Agent Orange I1, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Agent Orange IV, 611 F. Supp.
1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Agent Orange I, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd
on other grounds, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. Judge Weinstein noted that "[o]ver 2.6 million veterans from the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand served in Vietnam during the relevant period . . .
. The number of persons from that group believed to have had some chance of expo-
sure to Agent Orange has been variously estimated as between 600,000 and
2,400,000." See Agent Orange I, 597 F. Supp. 740, at 756. "The class size is far larger
since it includes family members of the exposed veterans." Agent Orange III, 611 F.
Supp. at 1230.
122. See Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1228-29. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party moving for summary judgment must show "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is' entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party having done so, the burden shifts to the
party opposing summary judgment to demonstrate that a genuine issue in respect to
a material fact does exist. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting Entitled "The
Holy Family with Saint Catherine and Honored Donor," 691 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.
1982).
123. Agent Orange 11, 611 F.Supp at 1231 (citing Agent Orange IX, 603 F.
Supp. 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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fects of exposure to Agent Orange. These are the only useful
studies having any bearing on causation. All the other data
supplied by the parties rests on surmise and inapposite extra-
polation from animal studies and industrial accidents. 1 24
Judge Weinstein then set forth his detailed analysis of
the proffered evidence on the causation issue. 12 5 The evidence
included the affidavits of Dr. Barry M. Singer, a physician
board certified in internal medicine, hematology (study of
blood diseases), and oncology (study of tumors). " ' These affi-
davits were accompanied by statements made by 282 individ-
ual veteran plaintiffs regarding their exposure to Agent Or-
ange and their illnesses. 127 In these statements, the veterans
alleged that they " 'saw spraying of Agent Orange, entered de-
foliated areas and consumed local food and water.' "1128
The veterans' statements then described their diagnosed
medical problems and referred to an attached "checklist" of
symptoms which they attributed to exposure to Agent Orange
in Vietnam.12 9 The Agent Orange court stated that "[a] peru-
sal of the checklists reveals that plaintiffs believe they suffer
most frequently from 'behavioral' disorders: memory loss, in-
creased irritability, anger and anxiety, insomnia, confusion,
depression, and tremors."130 The statements submitted by the
veteran plaintiffs further described their individual medical
history, as well as any tobacco, alcohol or drug use.' The
plaintiffs also alleged that they had not been exposed to any
toxic chemical other than Agent Orange. 132
Based on his examination of such statements, and on his
review of the literature regarding the biomedical effects of
Agent Orange, Dr. Singer analyzed the various ailments suf-
fered by the plaintiffs. He noted at the outset that the princi-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1231-39.
126. Id. at 1235-38.
127. Id. at 1235.
128. Id. at 1235.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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pal chemical agent contained in the Vietnam herbicide Agent
Orange, 2,4-D,2,4,5-T and 2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin,
" 'are potent and toxic agents capable of inducing a wide vari-
ety of adverse effects both in animals and in man.' "133 Singer
also stated that liver disorders have developed in humans af-
ter industrial exposure, and in dogs, rats, mice, and primates
after subacute and chronic exposure.1 3' 4 He further relied upon
animal and industrial exposure studies in concluding that "el-
evated cholesterol or triglyceride levels . . . 'are compatible
with' exposure to polychlorinated herbicides" such as Agent
Orange, and in concluding that "many neurological symptoms
complained of by the plaintiffs are 'clearly compatible with'
the known effects of dioxin on the human nervous system."136
Singer proceeded in a similar manner to link numerous
additional symptoms complained of by the veteran plaintiffs
to the reported effects of exposure to the herbicide Agent Or-
ange. Ultimately, Singer opined:
'Assuming the truth of the [veterans' statements], and ab-
sent any evidence of pre-existing, intervening, or super-
seding causes for the symptoms and diseases complained
of... it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical
probability (that is, more likely than not) that the medi-
cal difficulties described by the affiants were proximately
caused by exposure to Agent Orange.'38
The court in Agent Orange rejected the validity of such
proffered expert testimony."3 7 Judge Weinstein had initially
noted that only two diseases, chloracne and porphyria, have
been recognized by Congress as having a possible connection
to Agent Orange exposure, but that the plaintiffs had not es-
tablished their affliction with such diseases."3 8 Discussing the
133. Id. at 1236 (quoting Singer Aff. 5)(emphasis in original); see also Agent
Orange I, 597 F. Supp. at 750.
134. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1236.
135. Id., 611 F. Supp. at 1236.
136. Id. at 1237 (quoting Singer Aff.)(emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 1238.
138. Id. (citing Agent Orange I, 597 F. Supp. 740, 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Veterans
Administration, Adjudication of Claims Based on Exposure to Dioxin or Ionizing Ra-
19921
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specific analysis of Dr. Singer, Judge Weinstein next noted
that "[o]ne need hardly be a doctor of medicine to make the
statement that if X is a possible cause of Y, and if there is no
other possible cause of Y, X must have caused Y."139 The
court further asserted that it had "reviewed these and other
like studies dealing with animal laboratory studies, industrial
accidents, and other products. They suggest that dioxin may
cause diseases in animals, including man. They are not corre-
lated to those exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam. At most,
they collectively have the probative force of a scintilla of evi-
dence. '"40 The court also explained that laboratory animal
studies "'require making the assumption that chemicals be-
have similarly in different species.' ,,4
Turning to a legal discussion of the standards governing
the admissibility of expert opinion, the Agent Orange court
recognized that, in a mass tort case such as Agent Orange,
epidemiological studies on causation assume a role of critical
importance. 42 The court further acknowledged the wide-
spread approval given by scholars to the growing judicial reli-
ance on such scientific evidence.143 This approval appeared-
consistent with the rule, noted by Judge Weinstein, that
doubts about whether proffered expert testimony would be
helpful to the trier of fact "should be resolved in favor of
diation, 50 Fed. Reg. 15848, 15849-50 (1985)).
139. Agent Orange I1, 611 F. Supp. at 1238.
140. Id.; see also Agent Orange 1, 597 F. Supp. at 783 ("This litigation presents
quite a different picture from one where long term repeated exposure to a highly
toxic substance leads a number of acknowledged experts to state flatly that the expo-
sure caused the disease"); cf. STEPHEN KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 25 (1983)
("Thousands of soldiers in Vietnam were exposed to Agent Orange, a chemical herbi-
cide, which may have afflicted them with cancer, skin disease, and other disorders").
141. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1241 (quoting Khristine L. Hall & Ellen
K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 441, 442-43 (1983)).
142. Agent Orange I1, 611 F.Supp at 1239-40.
143. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1240 (citing Bert Black & David E.
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 732
(1984); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983);
Novel Scientific Evidence supra note 11, at 1197 (1980); Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact
and Science in the Courts, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 1080 (1966)).
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admissibility.""'4
Accordingly, Judge Weinstein saw as one principal basis
for the liberal attitude towards the admissibility of relevant
expert testimony Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 702 provides for opinion testimony by experts "if scien-
tific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to determine a fact in issue" and the witness is
"qualified as an expert by knowledge, experience, training or
education."145 Thus, stated Judge Weinstein, courts have
adopted the liberal attitude embodied in Rule 702, which
counsels admissibility whenever the proposed expert testi-
mony would be helpful to the trier."6
The Agent Orange court noted that, until recently, courts
had applied the more restrictive Frye test of general accept-
ance in the relevant scientific community. 1 7 Now, however,
the assessment of novel testimony involves a balancing of the
relevance, reliability and helpfulness of the evidence against
the likelihood of waste of time, confusion and prejudice." 8
Nevertheless, the court stated, "[w]hen either the expert's
qualifications or his testimony lie at the periphery of what the
scientific community considers acceptable, special care should
be exercised in evaluating the reliability and probative worth
of the proffered testimony under Rules 703 and 403.""' The
144. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1242 (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1975)).
145. FED. R. EvID. 702.
146. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
147. Id.; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
148. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1242; see United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S. Ct. 1025 (1979); but cf. Lucinda E. Minton,
Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980) (arguing that modi-
fied Frye test is preferable to balancing adopted in Williams).
149. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1242 (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239
(qualifications and professional stature of expert as well as non-judicial uses to which
the scientific technique is put may constitute circumstantial evidence of the tech-
nique's reliability); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) ("a Ph.D. can be
found to swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish");
1992]
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court agreed that, under Rule 703, "'the assumptions which
form the basis for the expert's opinion, as well as the conclu-
sions drawn therefrom, are subject to rigorous examina-
tion.' "15, "'Rigorous examination,' is especially important in
the mass toxic tort context where presentation to the trier of
theories of causation depends almost entirely on expert
testimony." '151
It was with such propositions as his point of departure
that Judge Weinstein embarked upon a rigorous scrutiny of
the proposed testimony of Dr. Singer and other experts of-
fered on behalf of the Agent Orange plaintiffs. It is significant
that Judge Weinstein found that, under Rule 702, Singer's
testimony should be admitted. "His general scientific tech-
nique ... of making an inference from epidemiologic data and
animal studies . . . has been accepted by a sufficient number
of courts to allow judicial notice to be taken of its general ac-
ceptance.'152 The court further stated that "[tihe method of
drawing inferences employed by Dr. Singer could withstand
the flexible approach to Rule 702 admissibility followed in the
Second and Third Circuits. '153
However, for the court in Agent Orange, the further
screen provided by Rule 703 precluded the admissibility of
Dr. Singer's proposed testimony. Specifically, the court found
that the statements and "checklists"1 54 provided by the vet-
eran plaintiffs and relied upon by Singer "are not material
that experts in this field would reasonably rely upon and so
William A. Donaher et. al., The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1303, 1311-12 (1974)).
150. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1244 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1981)); see also Wilder
Enter., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1980);
Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirma-
tive Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 240-41 & n.26 (1984)
(trial court tests appropriateness of expert's reliance upon out-of-court data).
151. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1244.
152. Id. at 1243 (citing FED. R. EVID. 201; United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)).
153. Id. at 1243.
154. Id. at 1246.
[Vol. 9
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
must be excluded under Rule 703."'" The Agent Orange
court stated that it was taking judicial notice, "based on hun-
dreds of trials that no reputable physician relies on hearsay
checklists by litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to
the cause of their afflictions.'
56
Additionally, the court held that Rule 403 also barred the
proffered testimony. The court stated that "[a] false aura of
scientific infallibility, coupled with low probative value in-
creases resistance to admitting evidence since it multiplies the
hazards of misleading a jury.'"1"7 Because "speculation and un-
founded assumptions" ' underlay the proposed testimony of
Dr. Singer and similar experts, the probative value of their
testimony was reduced " 'perhaps to the level of the gossa-
mer.' "19 Thus, said the court, "[t]here is a strong probability
that the doctors' testimony would mislead and confuse at
least some members of the jury."' 60
Based on such analysis and the exclusion of plaintiffs'
proffered expert testimony on the issue of causation, Judge
Weinstein ruled that there was no genuine issue of fact in re-
spect to causation' 61 and, accordingly, granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the cases of the
Agent Orange plaintiffs.'62 His opinions in the Agent Orange
155. Id.
156. Id.; (citing, United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 n.18 (3d Cir.
1985); cf. Mannino v. Int'l Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981) (experts often
rely on studies, literature and tests in testifying)).
157. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1256; see New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662
F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); In re Air Crash Disas-
ter at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1980);
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 861 (1977).
158. Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1256.
159. Id. (quoting American Bearing Co. Inc. v. Litton Indus., 729 F.2d 943, 950
n.14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1260.
162. Id. at 1264; see also id. at 1267 (because expert's proposed testimony on
causation was excludable under Rule 703, plaintiff widow of Vietnam veteran failed
to establish that her husband's exposure to Agent Orange had caused his
lymphosarcoma and coronary artery disease and resulting death, and thus summary
judgment was granted in favor of defendants); Agent Orange I, 597 F. Supp. 740, 782-
95 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (during the settlement phase of the litigation, Judge Weinstein
1992]
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litigation illustrate the restrictive approach to the admissibil-
ity of proposed expert testimony applied by various courts.1 63
B. Admissibility of Expert Economic Testimony
Although the conflict between the liberal and restrictive
approaches to the admissibility of proposed expert testimony
has been primarily associated with medical issues of causation
in the toxic tort setting, this debate has also surfaced, to some
extent, in the context of proposed economic testimony. The
examined the problematic methodology and assumptions underlying the expert testi-
mony on causation upon which plaintiffs would have to rely).
163. See Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kansas 1984):
[w]hen a court of law determines responsibility for human suffering and
awards damages, it must do so based upon reasonable evidence, not upon
speculation or hypothesis .... [An informed court must guard against using
hypotheses for more than what they really are. Speculation is not valid and
trustworthy evidence even though that speculation is conservative, and comes
from eminent scientists. Lawsuits must be resolved by reasonable conclusions
based on the evidence, not by educated guesses.
Id. at 393-94; Emigh v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 710 F. Supp. 608 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
(adopting the Agent Orange independent scrutiny of proffered expert's methodology
and factual bases); see also United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465, 1474 (11th Cir.
1984) ("Where, as here, the basis of the expert's opinion has been thoroughly im-
peached, the court, as fact finder, is thus plainly authorized to reject the opinion
entirely"); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("[w]e hold today that [psychological stress evaluation] evidence, whether
in the form of raw data or expert opinion interpreting or extrapolating upon that
data, is inherently suspect .... "); United States v. Cox, 696 F.2d 1294, 1297 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 827 (1983).
It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit has seemed in conflict with itself in
respect to the level of scrutiny to be applied. Compare Washington v. Armstrong
World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1988); and Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826
F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing independent scrutiny of reliability); with
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. I, 902 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1990), and Peteet
v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Dow Chem. v.
Greenhill, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (both embracing the liberal approach). Further, the
District of Columbia Circuit has also applied a version of the restrictive approach, in
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829-32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 935 (1989). The Richardson Court opined that, in making a Rule 703 deter-
mination, a court must "look behind [an expert's] ultimate conclusion ... and ana-
lyze the adequacy of its foundation." Id. at 829. However, the court held that, be-
cause the epidemiological data regarding the drug Bendectin has thus far not
concluded that the drug is teratogenic (causing malformation of the fetus), "an opin-
ion refuting this scientific consensus is inadmissible for lack of an adequate founda-
tion." Ealy v. Richard-Merrill, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1990)..
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principal case addressing the issue of the proper level of scru-
tiny required under Rule 703 in respect to intended economic
evidence is In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Lit-
igation.'64 While dealing with proposed economic testimony in
the context of antitrust litigation, Japanese Antitrust is anal-
ogous to the Fifth Circuit's first opinion in the Christopher-
sen I case, because in Japanese Antitrust the court of appeals
also overruled the use of the restrictive approach by the dis-
trict court.
In the district court, where the case was called Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Industries Co.,'66 Judge
Edward R. Becker had addressed the admissibility of several
lengthy reports submitted by plaintiffs' expert witnesses.
Judge Becker acknowledged that Rule 703 "permits an expert
to base his opinion upon materials which would otherwise be
inadmissible . ".1.."66 However, Judge Becker was concerned
that the Rule may not sanction an expert's reliance upon
materials that have been independently excluded from evi-
dence by the court on hearsay grounds or because of
irrelevance.' 7
The district court in Zenith Radio noted the plaintiffs'
argument that Rule 703 incorporates a recognition that "one
facet of an expert witness's expertise is his ability to sift relia-
ble from unreliable information and to analyze the informa-
tion before him with full understanding of the extent of its
validity."'18 More significantly, the court acknowledged the
164. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
165. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
166. Id. at 1320.
167. Id.
168. Id. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 40 (3d
ed. 1984), stating that the view embodied in Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, that an expert witness may give an opinion on the basis of reports that are not
in evidence or are inadmissible under the hearsay rule, "is justified on the ground
that an expert in a science is competent to judge the reliability of statements made to
him by other investigators or technicians." See also FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory com-
mittee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283, stating, in part, that "a physician in his own practice
bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable variety
.... The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His valida-
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submission by plaintiffs' experts of uncontradicted affidavits
certifying that the information upon which they relied in pre-
paring their reports "was of a type generally relied upon by
experts in their respective fields."169 Nevertheless, the court,
asserting that "the question of 'reasonable reliance' is one for
judicial determination,"' 7 ° proceeded to analyze in great detail
the proffered evidence and to make "individualized rulings as
to admissibility.' 171
Initially, however, in attempting to develop a standard to
guide such analysis and rulings, the court examined the hear-
say exception which had evolved into Rule 703. The court
noted that such exception "was originally restricted to a lim-
ited group of cases," involving, for example, medical testi-
mony based on information received from nurses and special-
ists, or land or business valuation testimony. 172 Consequently,
the Zenith Radio court called this limited group of cases the
"mainstream" cases, and stated that these were "a logical out-
growth of the traditional exception to the hearsay rule for ex-
11173pert opinion ....
Judge Becker then proposed and implemented a stan-
tion, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial
purposes." (citing Rheingold, supra note 7, at 531). See generally Schooler v. State,
175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (geologist testimony based, in part, upon geo-
logical reports); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Town of Speedway, 210 N.E.2d 95, 98
(Ind. App. 1965) ("an expert is competent to judge the reliability of statements made
to him by other persons and taking these statements made to him by other persons
together with his own first hand observations comprises a sufficient basis for a direct
examination his own professional opinion .... "); Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541
S.W.2d 935, 940 (Ky. 1976) (expert may opine "based upon information supplied by
third parties which is not in evidence, but upon which the expert customarily relies in
the practice of his profession").
169. Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1320.
170. Id. at 1324. The court further stated:
We view the question of reasonable reliance to be a preliminary determination of
admissibility under (Federal Rule of Evidence] 104(a), analogous to the question of
qualification of the witness. We do not consider the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs'
experts to the effect that the material upon which they relied in forming their opin-
ions is of a type generally relied upon by experts in their respective fields as in any
way determinative of the issue.
Id. at 1325-26.
171. Id. at 1321.
172. Id. at 1322.
173. Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1326.
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dard, consisting of a series of factors, by which to determine
the reasonableness of reliance in cases outside the "main-
stream" of Rule 703:
1. The extent to which the opinion is pervaded or
dominated by reliance on materials judicially determined
to be inadmissible, on grounds of either relevance or
trustworthiness;
2. The extent to which the opinion is dominated or
pervaded by reliance upon other untrustworthy materials;
3. The extent to which the expert's assumptions have
been shown to be unsupported, speculative, or demon-
strably incorrect;
4. The extent to which the materials on which the
expert relied are within his immediate sphere of exper-
tise, are of a kind customarily relied upon by experts in
his field in forming opinions or inferences on that subject,
and are not used only for litigation purposes;
5. The extent to which the expert acknowledges the
questionable reliability of the underlying information,
thus indicating that he has taken that factor into consid-
eration in forming his opinion;
6. The extent to which reliance on certain materials,
even if otherwise reasonable, may be unreasonable in the
peculiar circumstances of the case. 7'
Because the proffered expert reports in Zenith Radio
174. Id. at 1330. See also American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus. Inc., 540 F.
Supp. 1163, 1169-71 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (adopting Judge Becker's standard and then
"carefully examin[ing] the underlying assumptions, inferences drawn and conclusions
reached by plaintiff's economist").
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were outside the "mainstream" contemplated by Judge
Becker, he applied his set of standards for determining rea-
sonable reliance. In undertaking his evaluation, Judge Becker
"proceed[ed] step by step through the report[s], examining
the bases for the opinions rendered according to the principles
[underlying Federal Rule of Evidence] 703 . . . .as well as
analyzing the assumptions, inferences, and conclusions as an
aid to considering whether the opinion assists the jury as re-
quired under Rule 702.''175 The Zenith Radio court concluded
that the major, critical opinions presented in the plaintiffs' ex-
pert reports were inadmissible because the underlying data re-
lied upon by the experts were "faulty" and the assumptions
created by the experts "invade[d] the province of the fact-
finder." 76
When the district court consequently entered final sum-
mary judgment in favor of the antitrust defendants, the plain-
tiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. In In re Japanese Electronic Products Anti-
trust Litigation, the Third Circuit concluded that the district
court had erred in using its improvised set of standards to
substitute its own determination of what materials experts
would reasonably rely on for the contrary determination of
the experts themselves.11 7
The court in Japanese Antitrust stressed that "[t]he
proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what
experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be. ' 178 The court
maintained that, under such a proper Rule 703 inquiry, it was
critical that the Zenith Radio record included the "unequivo-
cal and uncontradicted affidavits from each of the experts
that the data they relied on in forming their opinions were of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in their respective.
175. Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1336.
176. Id. at 1380.
177. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nor Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
178. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 276 (citing Wilder Enterprises v. Allied
Artists Pictures, 632 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1980); Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611
F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979)).
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fields."' 79 Indeed, once it is determined that the underlying
data is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field, "the rigorous examination should be conducted in the
cross-examination for which Rule 705 makes explicit provi-
sion. In that setting the fact-finder can be expected to deter-
mine the appropriate weight to be given to the testimony."180
However, according to the Japanese Antitrust court, in-
stead of adhering to the language and intent of Rule 703, the
district court substituted its own set of standards for deter-
mining reasonable reliance. 181 "In substituting its own opinion
as to what constitutes reasonable reliance for that of the ex-
perts in the relevant fields the trial court misinterpreted Rule
703.'l This approach involved "fundamental legal error be-
cause, as a matter of law, the district court must make a fac-
tual inquiry and finding as to what data experts in the field
find reliable. There is no discretion to forbear from making
this inquiry and finding.' 183 The court consequently held that
179. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 276. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
916 F.2d 829, 846 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting view of district court, 706 F. Supp. 358,
that "an expert's opinion on the reasonableness of his or her own data could not be
dispositive or Rule 703's limitation would be meaningless").
180. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 277-78. Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, un-
less the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EvID. 705.
181. 723 F.2d at 278.
182. Id. at 277. See also Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th
Cir. 1981):
The purpose of Rule 703 is to make available to the expert all of the kinds of
things that an expert would normally rely upon in forming an opinion, with-
out requiring that these be admissible in evidence. Under the Rule, the ex-
pert is free to give his opinion in his area of expertise. In short, through Rule
703, the law is catching up with the realities of professional life.
Id. at 851. The Mannino Court further states that "[great liberality is allowed the
expert in determining the basis of his opinions under Rule 703." Id.
183. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 277. The Third Circuit quoted Professor
McCormick:
[i]t is reasonable to assume that an expert in a science is competent to judge
the reliability of statements made to him by other investigators or techni-
cians. He is just as competent indeed to do this as a judge and jury are to
pass upon the credibility of an ordinary witness on the stand. If the state-
ments, then, are attested by the expert as the basis for a judgment upon
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the trial court had erred in excluding the expert opinion evi-
dence on the ground that such evidence was based on materi-
als not reasonably relied upon.184
III. Asbestos Litigation
The doctrinal tensions discussed above implicate the na-
ture of any preliminary judicial assessment of proffered expert
testimony. The party seeking to have such testimony excluded
will itself present the court with a rigorous examination and
critique of the proposed testimony and underlying methodol-
ogy. Such a rigorous critique will either be adopted by the
court, in letter or spirit, if the court favors a restrictive inter-
pretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, or presented di-
rectly to the jury in the form of cross-examination if the ex-
pert evidence has been deemed admissible. In either event,
lawyers and judges, who are usually laypersons in respect to
technical or scientific matters, must undertake, or become fa-
miliar with, the critical dissection of expert methodology and
proffered expert testimony.
Such is the case in asbestos litigation, a wide ranging spe-
cies of environmental litigation in which courts are increas-
which he would act in the practice of his profession, it seems that they should
ordinarily be a sufficient basis even standing alone for his direct expression of
professional opinion on the stand ....
723 F.2d at 277 (quoting CHARLES TILFORD McCORMICK, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
15, at 35-36 (2d ed. 1972)). "It was this view which the drafters incorporated in Rule
703. They did so over significant opposition." Id. (citing COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS Assoc. REPORT (April 1970)). Thus, the
Third Circuit Court in Japanese Antitrust continued that "[wihat the trial court did
in effect was to reject the decision of the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court,
and Congress and adhere to an unusually restrictive view as to the basis on which an
expert's opinion may be laid." Id.
184. Id. at 278. Finally, the Court in Japanese Antitrust turned to an examina-
tion of the admissibility of the proffered expert opinion eyidence under other rules of
evidence. The Court concluded that, considering the complexity of the economic is-
sues involved, exclusion under Rule 702 "of an opinion clearly based on expert judg-
ment as unhelpful to the factfinder was an abuse of discretion." Id. at 280.
The Court further indicated the propriety of then turning to an examination of
the admissibility of the proposed evidence under Rule 403. Id. However, the Court
noted that, because the trial court had not made a Rule 403 determination and de-
fendants had not urged exclusion under that Rule, the Court had no occasion to con-
sider whether exclusion under Rule 403 would be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 284.
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ingly being asked to address the relatively novel issue, at least
in the context of that litigation, of the propriety of market
share liability evidence. The use of a market share liability
approach has been most closely associated with litigation con-
cerning the drug diethylstilbestrol ("DES"). In such litigation,
use of market share theory by plaintiffs has been deemed ap-
propriate because DES was produced pursuant to one
formula, and consequently a defendant's market share will
tend accurately to reflect its culpability. '85
In asbestos litigation, however, courts have overwhelm-
ingly rejected use of such market share analysis. ' This is be-
cause such an approach usually fails to account for the fact
that the toxicity of any particular asbestos-containing product
varies depending on the specific nature of the asbestos compo-
nent. Unlike the drug DES, asbestos products may contain
one or more of various asbestos silicates.1 8 Each type of fiber
has a different toxicity. In addition, other significant variables
include "the physical properties of the product itself, the per-
centage of asbestos used in the product,"' 8  the form of the
product and the amount of dust it generates.' 89 The greater
185. See generally Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 949 (1989) (adopting market share theory); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P.2d 924, (Ca. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, (1980) (market share); cf.
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wisc. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984) (risk share theory).
186. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1468 n.24 (10th Cir. 1988);
Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1987); Bateman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1986); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher
Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983); Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389
(E.D.Mich. 1987); Hannon v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.La.
1983); Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D.Pa. 1982); In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 543 F.Supp 1152 (N.D.Cal. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.Ga. 1982); Tidler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 95 F.R.D. 332
(D.C.D.C. 1982); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989); Case v.
Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987); Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987);
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1985); Mullen v. Armstrong World
Inds., 200 Cal. App.3d 250, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1988).
187. See Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1985).
188. Celotex at 538.
189. Id.
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the "product's [tendency] to produce airborne fibers, the
greater. . ." the likelihood that the fibers will be ingested and
produce disease. 90
Nevertheless, it has been suggested, for purposes of re-
lieving the docket and streamlining the massive asbestos liti-
gation, that the scope of such litigation might be limited by
"[tihe conduct of 'single issue trials' to determine market
share."'' Such an approach would be one "means of allocat-
ing responsibility between different defendants on a uniform
basis in all cases."' 92 Indeed, faced with the massive asbestos
docket in his court and aware of the situation nationally,
Judge Jack B. Weinstein, during proceedings in the Brooklyn
Naval Shipyard Joint Asbestos Litigation, opined that
[t]he percentage of responsibility problem should be elim-
inated .... One possible way is either through a massive
trial to ascertain defendant/corporation shares of the New
York market, possibly by analogy to the case of
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co ..... To accomplish this re-
sult, it might be necessary to consolidate all cases for a
single issue trial on percentage of liability while proceed-
ing simultaneously or consecutively with separate trials
on exposure and damages. There are serious questions
about this approach. However, it must be considered. If
we can reduce the issues solely to exposure and damages,
we can use an assembly line type system either with "pro-
fessional" jurors who would be impaneled for many cases,
or by stipulation .... 198
Although such offensive use of a market share approach
in asbestos litigation, while extremely controversial, thus may
loom on the horizon, the defensive use of this approach has
already occurred in numerous asbestos trials nationwide. As
will be shown, the asbestos defendants, seeking to present
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Daniel Wise, Verdicts of $31 Million In Asbestos Lawsuits, 205 N.Y.L.J., 1,
1-2 (Jan. 25, 1991).
193. Transcript of Proceedings, In re: New York Asbestos Litigation (Brooklyn
Navy Yard), CV 90 9999, at 10-11 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1991).
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such a market share defense in the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard
litigation before Judge Weinstein, recently stood at a cross-
roads. Use of such a defense promised to relieve major de-
fendants of vast shares of responsibility for having caused the
illnesses and deaths of scores of workers nationwide who had
been exposed to asbestos-containing dust. As will be further
explained, the court's choice of a restrictive or liberal ap-
proach to proffered market share testimony directly provided
the key to the success of this defense.
A. Overview of Asbestos Litigation and the Market Share
Defense Theory
By way of overview, it should be noted that the massive
asbestos docket arises from the fact that there are currently
pending in the federal courts approximately 35,000 cases in
which claims are made for personal injuries or wrongful death
resulting from exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing
products.' 94 Additionally, approximately 70,000 similar cases
are pending in various state courts. 9 5 These lawsuits have
named several hundred companies as defendants for their
roles in having manufactured, processed, distributed, mar-
keted and sold products containing asbestos. These actions
comprise the current phase of the national "asbestos scene, an
unparalleled situation in American tort law."'9 6
194. Stephen Labaton, Lawyers Clash on Plan to Hear Asbestos Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 1991, at D2, col. 5.
195. Id. at D2, col. 5. A report issued by a committee of Federal judges ap-
pointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to study the role of the courts in
resolving asbestos cases "predicted that the number of asbestos cases, which are al-
ready clogging dockets across the nation, would grow by 50 percent within three
years." Stephen Labaton, Judges See A Crisis in Heavy Backlog of Asbestos Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 3. The New York Times further stated that,
"[iln the year ended June 30, [1990], an average of 1,140 asbestos suits were filed
monthly in Federal district courts, with some districts facing dockets that are more
than one-third filled with asbestos cases." Id. at D18, col. 3. Moreover, "[flor every
asbestos case settled or tried, nearly two new ones are being filed." Id. at Al, col. 3.
196. Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 394 (2d Cir. 1989); In re School As-
bestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also
Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1283 (2d Cir. 1990); Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 app. at 1338-39 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), on
reh'g, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
19921
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The complaints in these lawsuits usually allege that the
defendants are liable because they negligently failed to warn
of the extreme and inherent dangers of exposure to asbes-
tos,19 7 of which the defendants knew or, with the exercise of
The magnitude of this situation flows from the fact that,
[wihile the use and manufacture of asbestos products have declined in the
last decade, injuries from more than half a century of exposure are only be-
ginning to become apparent. Experts predict that by the end of the century
as many as 200,000 deaths in the United States will have been caused by
asbestos-related diseases and that the number will rise to 265,000 by the year
2015.
Stephen Labaton, Judges See A Crisis in Heavy Backlog of Asbestos Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
197. Asbestos is a white or light gray natural mineral, obtained through mining
processes chiefly from actinolite and amphibole, occurring in long slender needles or
fibrous masses that historically (and profitably) has been woven into acid-resisting,
nonconducting, and fireproof articles. As early as 1935, however, asbestos was widely
recognized as a mortal threat affecting a large proportion of those who had regularly
worked with the material. Because most asbestos materials are highly friable (easily
crumbled), the fibers are easily airborne and consequently may be inhaled. Although
the disease process does not become evident for the first few, or even the first several,
years no matter how intense the exposure, lung scarring is inevitable as the mineral
fibers accumulate in the lungs. See generally BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL
AND LEGAL ASPECTS 16-32 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter, CASTLEMAN]; I. SELIKOFF &
DAVID LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 23 (1978); Allan Lanza, et al., Effects of the In-
halation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers, 50 PUBL. HEALTH REP.
1-12 (1935); Allan Lanza et al., Industrial Dusts and the Mortality from Pulmonary
Disease, 39 AMER. REV. TUBERC. 419-38 (1939).
Two incurable diseases that may result from exposure to asbestos are asbestosis
and mesothelioma. A unique aspect of asbestosis that distinguishes it from other oc-
cupational or environmental lung diseases, such as silicosis, coal-worker's pneumon-
coniosis, and berylliosis, is the presence of asbestos bodies and fibers predominantly
in lung tissue. The symptoms most commonly associated with this disease include
breathlessness and dry cough, although these rarely occur before a decade following
initial exposure, when the asbestosis is already well-entrenched. Other common
problems are clubbing of the fingers, as well as impaired blood oxygenation and se-
vere alterations in the pulmonary circulation.
Malignant pleural mesothelioma, a particular type of lung cancer whose only
known cause is exposure to asbestos, frequently develops twenty to thirty-five years
following the initial exposure. Mesothelioma usually results in severe and extreme
chest pain and shortness of breath caused by compression of the lung by the enlarg-
ing tumor and related pleural effusion (or accumulation of fluid around the lungs).
The chest pain may be localized or diffuse, afflicting the shoulders and upper abdo-
men as well. A victim of this disease will also experience persistent coughing, abdomi-
nal cramps and pain, swelling of the abdomen, extreme weight loss (especially accom-
panying chemotherapy), and pleural hemorrhaging. See Leon S. Gottlieb, The Range
of Medical Abnormalities Resulting from Asbestos Exposure, reprinted in
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
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ordinary care, should have known.198 The complaints often
SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS -
ASBESTOS DISEASE UPDATE 1-35 (Special Supp. March 1989); see generally Karen
Hamm Antman, Malignant Mesothelioma, 303 N. ENG. J. MED. 200-02 (1980); James
Brenner, et al., Malignant Mesothelioma of the Pleura: Review of 123 Patients, 49
CANCER 2431-35 (1982); David Grant et al., Computed Tomography of Malignant
Pleural Mesothelioma, 7 J. Comp. Ass. Tom. 626-32 (1983); Irving J. Selikoff, Jacob
Churg & E. Cuyler Hammond et al., Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 J.A.M.A.
22-26 (1984).
It is telling that, by the 1960's, mesothelioma cases were being seen in people
who had been only briefly and casually exposed to asbestos, such as household com-
panions of asbestos workers or those who lived in the neighborhood of an asbestos
facility. James Wagner et al., Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Exposure
in the North Western Cape Province, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PNEUMOCONIOSIS CON-
FERENCE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG (1960); Michael
Newhouse et al., Epidemiology of Mesotheliomal Tumors in the London Area, 132
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 674-79 (1965).
198. Perhaps the most infamous of numerous pieces of evidence establishing
knowledge on the part of the asbestos industry generally, since as early as the 1930's,
regarding the health hazards attendant to exposure to asbestos is the 1982 Affidavit
of Charles H. Roemer, formerly a prominent Paterson, New Jersey attorney and
chairman of the Paterson Industrial Commission. In that affidavit, Roemer described
a particular meeting he had arranged and attended at the New York City corporate
headquarters of the Johns-Manville Corporation, the world's largest asbestos com-
pany, with 25,000 employees and more than fifty factories and mines in the United
States and Canada. Roemer's affidavit reads, in part, as follows:
3. Sometime in 1942-43, I was advised by my cousin, Dr. Jacob Roemer, that
in the course of reviewing chest X-rays of employees at the Union Asbestos
and Rubber Company's Paterson plant he had observed a significant number
with lung changes which he believed were due to exposure to asbestos. Dr.
Roemer suggested that the men be advised of his findings and that they se-
cure outdoor employment which did not involve exposure to asbestos dust.
Dr. Roemer said unless this was done immediately the men would suffer from
painful asbestos diseases.
4. Immediately I reported what Dr. Roemer said to Robert Cryor, the Union
Asbestos and Rubber Company Plant Manager, and Edward Shuman, the
Assistant Plant Manager.
5. I was then informed that in accordance with the labor union contract, the
5 or 6 employees in question could not be discharged without the consent of
the union. The union refused to consent to their dismissal.
6. I then suggested that since Johns-Manville was the largest asbestos com-
pany in the country, we should set up an appointment to see how they were
handling the asbestos health problem.
7. Mr. Cryor and Mr. Shuman set up an appointment with Johns-Manville.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cryor, Mr. Shuman and I met with Vandiver Brown,
General Attorney for Johns-Manville and the President of the corporation, at
Johns-Manville corporate headquarters in New York City.
8. We advised the Johns-Manville officials of Dr. Roemer's findings and
43
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further allege that the defendants are strictly liable, regard-
asked them if Johns-Manville's physical examination program had turned up
similar findings and, if so, what Johns-Manville was doing about it.
9. In response, Vandiver Brown stated that Johns-Manville's physical exami-
nation program had, indeed, also produced findings of X-ray evidence of as-
bestos disease among workers exposed to asbestos and that it was Johns-
Manville's policy not to do anything nor to tell the employees of the X-ray
findings. Vandiver Brown went on to say that it was foolish for us to be con-
cerned and that if Johns-Manville's workers were told, they would stop work-
ing and file claims against Johns-Manville, and that it was Johns-Manville's
policy to let them work until they quit work because of asbestosis or died as a
result of asbestos-related diseases.
Affidavit of Charles H. Roemer, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New
York, In re Johns-Manville Corporation et al., Debtors Civ. No. 465-83C/1-84C/688-
83C (Sept. 29, 1982), reprinted in CASTLEMAN, supra note 197, at 152-54 [hereinafter
Roemer Affidavit].
"At a subsequent deposition taken in April of 1984, Roemer remembered that he
had said, 'Mr. Brown, do you mean to tell me you would let them work until they
dropped dead?' [and that Brown had replied,] 'Yes, we save a lot of money that
way.'" CASTLEMAN, supra note 197 (citing Deposition of Charles H. Roemer at 28,
U.S. Cl. Ct., Johns-Manville v. United States Civ. No. 465-83C/1-84C/688-83C (April
25, 1984)).
Additionally, as more evidence. has come to light, juries have increasingly
awarded plaintiffs punitive damages, finding that defendants acted with wanton and
reckless disregard of the known risks of asbestos exposure. See, e.g., Johnson v. Celo-
tex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding combined punitive damages as-
sessments against Celotex Corporation in the amount of $2,000,000, against Raymark
Corporation in the amount of $2,000,000, and against the Owens-Illinois Company in
the amount of $1,800,000); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 27 (1990) (upholding punitive damages award of
$2,300,000 against the Pittsburg Corning Corporation); Passentino v. Raymark In-
dus., 896 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding $500,000 punitive damages award against
Owens-Illinois); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding
$100,000 punitive damages award against the Celotex Corporation); In re A.H. Robins
Co. Inc., 89 B.R. 555, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 1988) (upon declaring bankruptcy in 1985,
A.H. Robins had paid or appealed punitive damages awards totalling over $23 mil-
lion, and still faced over 5,000 claims for compensatory and punitive damages). Cur-
rent litigation challenging the constitutionality of the imposition of multiple punitive
damages awards for the same course of conduct is not within the purview of this
article. See generally Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Supreme Court Urged To
Place Limits on Setting of Punitive Damages Awards, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 529-30 (Oct. 11, 1990); Olson & Bonrons v. Corboy, At Issue: Punitive
Damages, 77 A.B.A. J. 40-41 (Jan. 1991); Bruce Fein & William Bradford Reynolds,
High Court May End Judicial Sweepstakes, MANHATTAN LAW 26 (June 1990); John
Calvin Jefferies, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139 (1986); Jeffrey W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985).
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less of their level of awareness, because they manufactured or
supplied asbestos-containing products in a condition not rea-
sonably contemplated by the ultimate consumers and unrea-
sonably dangerous for their intended use.
Naturally, defendants in asbestos litigation, when not
reaching settlement agreements with plaintiffs, have set forth
various defenses for use at trial. For example, a defendant
may rely upon the so-called "state of the art" defense, claim-
ing that, at the time it marketed its asbestos-containing prod-
ucts that caused the particular injury complained of, scientific
and medical knowledge regarding the hazards of exposure to
asbestos had not yet been developed and disseminated. 99
Alternatively, a defendant may rely upon a product nexus
or proximate causation defense. If so, the defendant may
grant that the plaintiff's injury was caused by exposure to an-
other company's asbestos-containing products, but the de-
fendant will deny that the plaintiff was exposed to its own
products."' A related defense may concede that the plaintiff
was certainly injured, but deny that such injury resulted from
any exposure to asbestos.2 0 1
When seeking to develop a product nexus or proximate
causation defense, an asbestos defendant will usually claim
that the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing
the requisite element of causation. In order to succeed on his
claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving as a factual matter
that he was exposed to the defendant's specific merchandise
and that it is more likely than not that this exposure was a
substantial factor in his injury.202 "Plaintiff [has] to establish
199. Evidence such as the Roemer affidavit, supra note 198, however, has tended
to vitiate and delegitimize such a state of the art defense.
200. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.
1983); cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984) (interpreting Louisiana law); see also Black-
ston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting
Georgia law).
201. Resorting to such a defense, for example, a defendant may argue that plain-
tiff's lung disease resulted from heavy cigarette smoking, and not exposure to asbes-
tos. Of course, this defense will have virtually no chance of succeeding if the plaintiff
had been diagnosed as having asbestosis or mesothelioma, the cause of which is al-
most always viewed exclusively as exposure to asbestos.
202. See, e.g., Thompson, 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1992]
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that his injury was proximately caused by the [defendant's]
asbestos and produce evidence identifying [the particular de-
fendant's] product as being a factor in his injury."203
On the other hand, the asbestos supplier may also come
forward with a statistical analysis in order to establish the un-
likelihood that its own asbestos-containing merchandise could
have caused a particular plaintiff's injuries. Such an analysis
attempts to demonstrate that the defendant's market share of
the asbestos products at the particular site where the plaintiff
was exposed was minuscule.
By means of such a market share approach, a defendant
will try indirectly to transfer liability to his co-defendants in
the litigation. This attempt to minimize responsibility be-
comes crucial in a jurisdiction such as New York, where,
under the General Obligations Law, the jury will ultimately be
asked to apportion fault among the numerous settling and
non-settling co-defendants.20 4 Such apportionment is also re-
quired by Article 16 of New York's Civil Practice Law and
Rules, which prescribes that, in an action for personal injury,
any one defendant found to be fifty percent liable or less
shall, under most circumstances, be liable to the claimant, for
non-economic loss, for no more than "that defendant's equita-
ble share determined in accordance with the relative culpabil-
ity of each person causing or contributing to the total liability
1102 (1984); Blackston, 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985).
203. Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1286 (2d Cir. 1989); cf. Hymowitz
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
204. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1976). The legislative history of
General Obligations Law section 15-108 indicates that:
[tihe rule enunciated in section 15-108(b) of the General Obligations Law
appears to be the most reasonable solution to the settlement problem by re-
lieving a tortfeasor obtaining a good faith release from any further contribu-
tion, while at the same time allowing the other tortfeasors to prove the
releasee's equitable share of the damages was greater than the value of the
release, thus reducing plaintiff's claim against the other tortfeasors by that
larger amount. Under such a scheme, plaintiffs will have to guard against
defendants doing their utmost to shift the major portion of the blame onto
the settling tortfeasor, thus reducing plaintiff's total claim.
Memorandum From Douglas R. McCuen, New York State Assembly, Standing Com-
mittee Central Staff, to Assemblymen DiCarlo, Fink, Murphy, Suchin (Mar. 25,
1974).
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for non-economic loss ....
Consequently, a company that succeeds in convincing the
jury that its products were only minimally present at the
place of plaintiff's exposure will, naturally, be assigned only a
very small percentage of the fault. When the damages award
for non-economic loss is apportioned accordingly pursuant to
Article 16, the defendant will probably be responsible for only
a small percentage of the verdict.206
This article next examines the attempt of one former
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products, the Owens-Illi-
nois Company ("Owens-Illinois" or "0-I"), now an asbestos
defendant in numerous lawsuits, to shift liability to its co-de-
fendants by presenting such a market share analysis in vari-
ous trials nationwide. In particular, the article analyzes the
proffered expert testimony of an economist, Lewis C. Solmon,
most recently offered on behalf of Owens-Illinois, albeit un-
successfully, in the joint trial before Judge Jack B. Weinstein
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York,20 7 which trial consolidated several hundred cases
205. The doctrine of joint and several liability, as applied in New York state law,
controls the apportionment of liability in the federal Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation.
See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232, 236 (1944); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 851 (2d Cir.
1967); cf. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980). The
New York state legislature, however, in Article 16 of the Civil Procedure Law and
Rules, abrogated the doctrine of joint and several liability in certain situations. Thus,
New York Civil Practice Law section 1601 provides in relevant part, that in an action
for personal injury:
when the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the
total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such defendant to
the claimant for non-economic loss shall not exceed that defendant's equita-
ble share determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each per-
son causing or contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss ....
N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 1601(1) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1992).
206. Section 1602 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules provides for cer-
tain exceptions to the limitations on liability set forth in Article 16. Most notably, for
purposes of asbestos litigation, the limitations set forth in Article 16 do "not apply to
any person held liable for causing claimant's injury by having acted with reckless
disregard for the safety of others," and similarly do "not apply to any parties found
to have acted knowingly or intentionally, and in concert, to cause the acts or failures
upon which liability is based .. " N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 1602(7), (11) (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1992).
207. In re New York Asbestos Litig. (Brooklyn Navy Yard), CV 90-9999
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arising from asbestos-related injuries sustained by former
workers in the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard (hereinafter "Brook-
lyn Navy Yard" or "Navy Yard"). 08
It will be demonstrated that, as Judge Weinstein ulti-
mately ruled, such proffered testimony of Professor Solmon is
based on misleading and speculative assumptions. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether such problematic testimony
should be admitted (which would allow the jury to consider
what weight to assign the testimony in light of vigorous cross-
examination) or precluded (which would represent a judicial
determination that Professor Solmon should be prevented
from using his complex econometric model to confuse the is-
sues and mislead the jury).
As related, the Brooklyn Navy Yard consolidated trial
represented for the asbestos defendants a crossroad at which
an opportunity to avoid punishing verdicts hinged on the ap-
proach adopted by the court in assessing their proposed mar-
ket share evidence. Although aware that Judge Weinstein had
adopted a restrictive interpretation of Rule 703 in the context
of medical causation testimony in the Agent Orange litigation,
the parties were not certain that he would favor such height-
ened scrutiny and rigorous examination of an expert's meth-
odology in other settings.
B. Critique of Professor Solmon's Market Share Formula
This article next briefly sets forth the essential features of
Professor Solmon's market share formula, as well as certain
key assumptions within the formula that may be described as
misleading, and that skew the ultimate calculations at which
the formula arrives. Such analysis should: (1) provide some
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1991). This trial consolidates cases filed in the United States Dis-
trict Courts for both the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.
208. By order dated January 22, 1990, United States District Judge Eugene H.
Nickerson, endeavoring to manage a docket of several thousand personal injury and
wrongful death asbestos cases, assigned several hundred of such asbestos cases to Dis-
trict Judge Jack B. Weinstein for consolidated trial, provided that these assigned
cases had a "substantial nexus to the Brooklyn Navy Yard." Order of United States
District Judge Eugene H. Nickerson, In re Joint Eastern and Southern Districts As-
bestos Litigation (Jan. 22, 1990).
[Vol. 9
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insight into the unique nature of the prosecution of asbestos-
related claims; (2) demonstrate the manner by which statisti-
cal outcomes may be manipulated in the courtroom; and (3)
convey a sense of the task of a jury or court in evaluating mar-
ket share theory, or, more generally, complex expert opinion
testimony. The latter two goals pertain to problems univer-
sally present in environmental litigation.
The ultimate goal of Professor Solmon's market share
analysis is to arrive at a formula that is designed to establish
that 0-I's "Kaylo" was rarely used at the Navy Yard. Profes-
sor Solmon has created a ratio to accomplish his goal, using as
the numerator his figure for the amount of Kaylo shipped to
the Navy Yard over the years, and as the denominator his es-
timated amount of all asbestos-containing products shipped
to the Navy Yard for each corresponding year.209
In proffering the testimony of Professor Solmon, Owens-
Illinois necessarily sought to place before the jury the complex
econometric formula from which Solmon has derived such a
ratio. It is reasonable that most jurors, likely unfamiliar with
the lingo of econometrics, would naturally not be apt to follow
in an analytically critical way Solmon's step-by-step calcula-
tion process. Their evaluation of the credibility of such pro-
cess, and of the soundness of Solmon's resulting conclusions,
therefore becomes problematic. This problem is necessarily a
key factor that directly informs the determination by courts
regarding the extent of their own initial scrutiny of the ex-
pert's methodology.
In the Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, the plaintiffs asked
the court, by detailed in limine motion, to evaluate and pre-
clude Professor Solmon's proposed testimony.21 0 Notwith-
209. Because only minimal documentation has survived, however, it is improba-
ble that there could be a reasonable basis for establishing such a ratio. Owens-Illinois
has produced only fragmentary paperwork and statistically insignificant records,
which reflect an indeterminable percentage of its Kaylo sales; the United States Gov-
ernment, as far as anyone can determine, has not retained purchase records with re-
spect to insulation products shipped to the Navy Yard beginning during the World
War II years.
210. It has been noted that "in limine ruling on evidence issues is a procedure
which *should, in a trial court's discretion, be used in appropriate cases." In re Japa-
nese Elect. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983); see also 21
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standing testimonial evidence of the widespread use at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard of Owens-Illinois' asbestos-containing
"Kaylo" 211 products from the early 1940's to 1958, Owens-Illi-
nois offered its economic witness in an attempt to establish
that O-I's market share of such products was indeed minus-
cule. In their motion papers, plaintiffs asserted that Professor
Solmon's notions thus run directly counter to the personal
recollections of numerous witnesses that 0-I was a major
player in the Navy Yard and that its Kaylo products were
present there in abundance.212
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5037, at 193-95 (1977); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 4.22 (1981) (supplement to
1 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1982)); Brennan, supra note
30, at 5; Henry B. Rothblatt & David H. Leroy, The Motion in Limine in Criminal
Trials: A Technique for the Pretrial Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L.J.
611, 614 (1972). The in limine procedure is touted not only because it is "far more
efficient than if the rulings [are] deferred until the trial, with consequent interrup-
tions, but also because [it permits] more thorough briefing and argument than would
[be] likely [were] the rulings deferred." Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 260.
211. "The Owens-Illinois Glass Company, of Toledo, Ohio, had developed Kaylo
during the late 1930s, and had begun manufacturing it in the early 1940s. The trade
name was derived from the so-called K factor - an engineering term for the rate at
which heat passes through an inch of insulation. The better the insulation, the lower
the heat loss, or K factor; hence the name 'Kaylo.'" PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS
MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 148 (1985).
212. See, e.g., Deposition Testimony of Harry Winston Brayne, as read into Trial
Transcript, at 18, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. CV-87-5151 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1989),
reprinted in Joint Appendix, at A337, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d
Cir. 1990); Trial Testimony of Benjamin Kierman, at 62, 71, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp.,
No. CV-87-5151 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1989), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at A381,
A390, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990); Deposition Testi-
mony of Moe Rapchick, at A107, as read onto Trial Transcript, O'Brien v. Celotex
Corp., No. CV-87-5151 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1989), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at
A463, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990); Videotape Deposi-
tion Testimony of Remo Paternoster, at 27, Paternoster v. Raymark Indus., No. 85-
1778 (S.D. Ohio, Western Div. Nov. 27, 1985), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at A923,
O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990); Deposition Testimony of
Murray Zwilling, at 11, 20-25, Scottino v. Celotex Corp., No. C-1-83-1973 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 11, 1987), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at A936, A943-945, O'Brien v. Celotex
Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990); Deposition Testimony of Harry Winston
Brayne, at 30, Brandfon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. CV-80-207948 (Superior
Ct., Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport May 16, 1985), reprinted in Joint Ap-
pendix at A979, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990); Deposi-
tion Testimony of James Harold Shannon, at 77, 81-94, Shannon v. Fibreboard Corp.,
No. L-053346-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Middlesex Cty.), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at
A1070, A1074-77, O'Brien v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-9111/9117 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Summarizing and simplifying Professor Solmon's meth-
odology, it can fairly be stated that, in his formula, Professor
Solmon first selected the years during which 0-I marketed its
Kaylo products, as 1943 through 1958, and then, for each such
year, attempted to determine the Brooklyn Navy Yard's na-
tional share of shipbuilding and repair activity. The formula
then sought to indicate the amount of asbestos-containing in-
sulation used in shipbuilding nationwide. Finally, Solmon at-
tempted to calculate the amount of asbestos insulation at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, and O-I's market share at the Navy
Yard of such asbestos insulation.
1. Determining the Brooklyn Navy Yard's National
Share of Shipbuilding Activity
In first seeking to arrive at the national share of ship-
building activity occurring at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Pro-
fessor Solmon set forth the actual number of civilians working
in government naval yards each year nationwide, the number
of civilian employees at the Brooklyn Navy Yard over the
years, the number of persons employed in private shipyards
for each year, and the number of naval vessels, by steel ton-
nage, that were built in and delivered from private shipyards
in the years indicated.113 Of course, the Brooklyn Navy Yard
was a government owned and operated shipyard, not a private
shipyard.
A significant problem inhering in Professor Solmon's
figures detailing the naval vessels, by steel tonnage, built in
private shipyards, is that Solmon here assumed only the new
construction of naval vessels at private shipyards, and did not
account for any overhaul, rip-out or repair activity that might
have occurred. 214 Professor Solmon acknowledged that, to the
extent that such activity occurred in the private yards, "[i]t is
possible there could be some understating" in his model of the
213. Deposition of Lewis C. Solmon, at 102-06, In re Joint Eastern District and
Southern District Asbestos Litigation (E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1989) [herein-
after First Solmon Deposition].
214. Id. at 106.
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private yard figures.2" Indeed, Everett C. Hunt, a Professor of
Marine Engineering, stated, upon reviewing Professor
Solmon's formula, that "Dr. Solmon assumes for purposes of
his analysis that none of the Navy-related activity in private
shipyards involved the overhaul or repair of existing naval
vessels. This is not correct. During the period 1943 to 1958,
the Navy made extensive use of private yards for repairs to
naval vessels. 216
As will be explained, any understating of the private yard
figures would ultimately lead, in Professor Solmon's model, to
a false decrease in the figure representing 0-I's market share
at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. It should first be noted, however,
that a court's determination that Professor Hunt's statement
is more credible than Professor Solmon's assumption would
not necessarily represent its mere preference in the "battle of
experts." Unlike the affidavit testimony of the defense expert
in Christophersen II, Dr. Sherwood Gorbach, who merely
stated that the accuracy of Dr. Miller's presumption has not
been established in medical science, here Professor Hunt is
claiming that, as a factual matter, Professor Solmon is wrong.
Indeed, Professor Solmon concedes that this may be the case.
215. Id. By way of explanation of the methodology of the market share analyst,
Solmon stated that "you know, we work with the best data we have available and
that was the best data." Id. at 114. Professor Solmon further explained that, if the
private yard figures "were a little higher or a little lower, it would not change the
ultimate result by that much." Id. Proceeding through the formula, it will be shown
that such understatement leads ultimately to a corresponding understatement of 0-
I's market share at the Navy Yard.
216. Affidavit of Everett C. Hunt, Professor of Marine Engineering, Webb Insti-
tute of Naval Architecture, Glen Cove, New York, sworn to August 16, 1990, at 2(a),
In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation (E.D.N.Y. and
S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter Hunt Affidavit]. Professor Hunt continued:
An example of this can be found in the July 1951 issue of the industry publi-
cation 'Marine Engineering and Shipping Review,' which contained an article
announcing that Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander of the Eastern
Sea Frontier, had given authorization for private yards to overhaul 186 naval
vessels. Furthermore, in early 1953, I was an engineering officer aboard the
U.S.S. Corregidor (CVE-58) during an extensive overhaul of main and auxil-
iary machinery at Maryland Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Balti-
more, Maryland. Typically, this overhaul included extensive removal and re-
placement of heat insulating materials.
[Vol. 9
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Nevertheless, such a factually incorrect assumption may
not be deemed fatal for purposes of a Rule 703 inquiry. As
stated in the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Clark in the
en banc decision in Christophersen II, Rule 703 is not con-
cerned with whether experts in the field would have reasona-
bly relied on the "particular" underlying facts or data, but on
the "types" of underlying facts or data.
21 7
Professor Solmon arrived at a figure for the percentage of
naval tonnage constructed at the private shipyards by divid-
ing the naval tonnage in private yards by the total tonnage of
nonmilitary and military vessels constructed in such private
yards. Thus:
(nav. ton. prvt. yds.)
(% nay. ton. prvt. yds.) =
(nay. ton. prvt. yds.) + (non-nav. ton. prvt. yds.)
He then set forth the number of persons in private yards
working on naval shipbuilding projects by multiplying the
percentage of naval tonnage in private yards by the number of
private yard employees:
(# prvt. pers. wkg. on nay.) = (% nay. ton. prvt. yds.) X (# prvt. pers.)
By adding this figure, the number of persons in private yards
working on naval shipbuilding projects, to the total number of
persons working in naval yards, Professor Solmon calculated
the total number of persons throughout the United States
working on naval activity each year. 218 Thus:
(# pers. nay. projects) = (% nay. ton. prvt. yds.) X (# prvt. pers.)
Finally, Solmon calculated the national share of ship-
building activity occurring at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Here,
Professor Solmon divided the total number of Navy Yard em-
ployees by the total number of persons working on naval
projects. Thus:
217. Christophersen II, supra note 89, at 1106, 1119.
218. First Solmon Deposition, supra note 213, at 108-09; Deposition of Lewis C.
Solmon, at 16, In re Joint'Eastern District and Southern District Asbestos Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. and S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Second Solmon Deposition].
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(# BNY pers.)
(% nav. act BNY) =
(# pers. nav. projects)
For this equation, any artificial diminution of the denom-
inator (# pers. nav. projects) will, of course, cause an increase
in the quotient (% nav. act. BNY). In other words, the lower
the value of the denominator in the above fraction, the greater
the value of the quotient. Omission of significant private yard
activity in respect to naval contracts will result in such a dim-
inution of denominator and increase in the quotient, repre-
senting the percentage of naval activity occurring at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard.
As will be shown in the discussion of the remaining vari-
ables in Professor Solmon's formula, an assessment of O-I's
market share at the Brooklyn Navy Yard will be distorted
under the Solmon formula if the figures for the above quo-
tient are distorted. In fact, the Solmon model significantly un-
dervaluates O-I's market share at the Navy Yard to the ex-
tent that it overcalculates that quotient.
2. Determining the Amount of Asbestos-Containing In-
sulation Used in Shipbuilding
Having arrived at a calculation for the national share of
shipbuilding activity occurring at the Brooklyn Navy Yard,
Professor Solmon next sought to determine the amount of as-
bestos-containing insulation used in shipbuilding. He began
by summarizing yearly expenditures for the construction and
repair of naval vessels.2 19 In developing such a summary,
Solmon relied upon naval budgets prepared by the Depart-
ment of Defense ("DOD"), which indicated expenditures on
"all ships that the Navy bought" during the years in question,
as well as various manufacturers' surveys, which provided
data on expenditures for the repair of naval vessels.220
Thus, in respect to the DOD budgets, Solmon assumed,
but could not confirm, that any expenditure credited to the
purchase of a ship was an expenditure for new shipbuilding
219. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 16.
220. Id. at 18-19.
[Vol. 9
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/2
EXPERT TESTIMONY
and construction. It is further unclear how the DOD budgets
and the manufacturers' surveys treated expenditures for ship
conversions. If conversion costs were treated both as ship
purchases, in the DOD data, and as repair costs, in the
surveys, then there would be an inflationary distortion of the
expenditure amounts used by Solmon. Any such augmenta-
tion would translate into a further artificial decrease in O-I's
Navy Yard market share under Solmon's formula. This is be-
cause the asbestos component of such construction and repair
of naval vessels would be estimated at an artificially high
level, which would ultimately decrease the significance of fixed
0-I sales amounts.
i. Solmon's Reliance on Oral Statements of a Phantom
Naval Architect
In deriving figures for the dollar amount of asbestos-con-
taining insulation used in shipbuilding, Professor Solmon
made a number of assumptions that were of moment to the in
limine court in striking S01mon's testimony. In the first in-
stance, Professor Solmon conceded that he was "not an expert
in shipbuilding, '221 and "[could not] read ships' specifica-
tions. ' 222 Nonetheless, in lieu of a well-documented associa-
tion with a known expert on shipbuilding (which expert might
have provided trustworthy and verifiable data on the use of
asbestos in shipbuilding), Solmon relied upon his recollection
of the oral estimations of a "naval architect" 223 with whom he
had spoken no more than twice, both times over the phone.224
In any event, that architect told Solmon in one phone
conversation that, for all ships, insulation products averaged
1% of the ship by weight. For destroyers, however, 2.6% of
the weight of the ship constituted insulation products.225
The architect concluded that, of those percentage figures,
"high temperature" Kaylo-type insulation would comprise
221. First Solmon Deposition, supra note 213, at 115.
222. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 23.
223. First Solmon Deposition, supra note 213, at 115-16.
224. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 23.
225. Id. at 24.
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32% of the 1% figure, and 29% of the 2.6% figure. Stated
Solmon, "[w]hen you take those, you get 32/100ths of 1% for
all ships and 47/100ths [sic] of 1% for destroyers. [The archi-
tect] estimated that approximately one-third of the ships were
destroyers and two-thirds were others. When you factor those
in, you get .0047. ' '226
On its face, Professor Solmon's rendition of the archi-
tect's computation is spurious. For if insulation products aver-
aged 1% of "all ships" by weight, then the class of destroyers
has already been included within the category of all ships. By
nevertheless separating destroyers from the larger group,
Solmon inflated the 0.32% figure to 0.47%.221
In this way Solmon concluded that, for any ship, 0.47%
of the ship's weight is formed of asbestos-containing insula-
tion. Such an inflated percentage, of course, further benefits
Professor Solmon's client, Owens-Illinois, because the higher
the percentage attributed to a ship's asbestos component, the
lower will be the valuation of O-I's market share at the Brook-
lyn Navy Yard.
This is so because, under the Solmon model, as the aver-
age asbestos component of ships generally is calculated at in-
creased levels, so will the amount of asbestos insulation used
in shipbuilding be calculated at increased levels. Conse-
quently, the amount of asbestos insulation attributed to the
Navy Yard will be seen as proportionately higher, with a re-
sulting decrease in that proportion of the asbestos used at the
Navy Yard attributable to Owens-Illinois.
ii. Solmon's equivalence of Weight and Dollars
Further, Professor Solmon's calculations were not by
weight, as were the architect's, but by dollar amounts. Thus,
in assuming that the weight values of ship materials are
strictly proportionate to their dollar values, Solmon extrapo-
lated that 0.47% of the cost of a ship's materials represents
226. First Solmon Deposition, supra note 213, at 122.
227. It is also curious that Solmon, by way of the phantom architect, singled out
destroyers, as opposed to aircraft carriers or battleships, for examples.
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the cost of its asbestos insulation component.228
Assuming that the architect was correct in assessing the
weight of asbestos insulation on a ship as roughly one-half of
1% of the total weight of the ship, there is nonetheless no
clear basis for Solmon's leap to the conclusion that roughly
one-half of 1% of a ship's cost is the dollar value of its asbes-
tos insulation. Professor Hunt, the naval engineer who di-
rectly reviewed Professor's Solmon's formula, has noted that
"[a]ssuming that all materials have the same dollar value per
pound is a distortion which weakens [Solmon's] analysis. "229
That engineer explains that "[a] precision machine such as a
turbine, compressor or pump will have a cost many times
greater than the structural steel used for the hull or any type
of heat insulation on a dollars-per-pound basis." 30
Moreover, regarding the 0.47% figure, Professor Solmon
conceded that "one of the assumptions is that we have taken
that same fraction for shipbuilding, conversion and repair dol-
lars. One might argue that, in repair, given they were not do-
ing the hull again, a higher proportion would be asbestos-con-
taining block and pipe insulation. 2 31 If it is true that this
assumption thus understated this asbestos-related factor,
Solmon's formula, in this instance, would tend to overstate 0-
I's market share, because the fixed 0-I sales values would oc-
cupy a greater proportion of the recognized whole asbestos
component.
228. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 25.
229. Hunt Affidavit, supra note 216, at V 2(d).
230. Id. Professor Hunt further explains that the assumption of:
an equivalence between weight values and dollar values for ship materials...
is inappropriate since a World War II warship in light draft condition con-
sists of a complex of hull structure, machinery, fittings, electrical apparatus
and insulating and finishing materials. A precision machine such as a turbine,
compressor or pump will have a cost many times greater than the structural
steel used for the hull or any type of heat insulation on a dollars-per-pound
basis. Assuming that all materials have the same dollar value per pound is a
distortion which ... is apparent in our everyday lives where we find we can
purchase potatoes by the pound but electronic components, such as a T.V.,
are valued by their function not by weight.
Id.
231. First Solmon Deposition, supra note 213, at 117.
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iii. Solmon's Reliance on a Chart Regarding Construction
of 1930's Nonmilitary Vessels
In support of his leap from weight to monetary figures,
Professor Solmon stated that the architect referred him to a
"chart from the shipbuilding business in the United States of
America," entitled "Materials Used in Shipbuilding. '232
However, the chart describes itself as "show[ing] the val-
ues and distribution of materials required in a $75,000,000 an-
nual shipbuilding program of the usual types of vessels built
in the United States, consisting of passenger and combination
vessels, tankers, cargo vessels, yachts and small crafts. '233
The chart continues that "[t]his program corresponds
closely to what is expected to be the average annual construc-
tion for a five-year period from January 1, 1930. ' '234 Using this
chart, Solmon discounts the fact that the ships built at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard were aircraft carriers and battleships,
not yachts and passenger crafts.
The chart depicts expenditures for "insulation, deck cov-
ering and tiling" as $1,084,000, or 1.4% of the total
$75,000,000 budget. Solmon then assumes, based on his recol-
lection of the architect's analysis, that one-third of the "insu-
lation, deck covering and tiling" figure will represent the ex-
penditure for asbestos-containing insulation.235 Accepting the
one-third estimate, Solmon concludes that 0.48% of the
materials comprising a ship would be asbestos-containing
insulation. 36
However, it would appear self-evident that the material
composition of battleships and destroyers is far more dense
than that of the passenger vessels, cargo vessels and yachts
dealt with by the chart. Moreover, the magnitude of the steel
component of the warships constructed in the Navy Yard was
232. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 25.
233. Chart entitled, Materials Used In Shipbuilding, attached as Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit 11 to Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218 (emphasis added).
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 26.
236. Id. At some point, and without explanation, Professor Solmon replaces the
0.47% figure with the figure 0.48%.
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not comparable to that aspect of the significantly lighter non-
military crafts." 7 To the extent that the imputation of a light
craft asbestos component to the Navy warships results in an
overestimation of such asbestos component within the war-
ships, the 0-I percentage at the Navy Yard is underestimated.
Consequently, Solmon's reliance on the nonmilitary 1930's
chart is highly problematic. Notwithstanding such problems,
Professor Solmon, based on the chart, concludes that 0.48%
of shipbuilding and repair expenditures in respect to World
War II warships were devoted to the asbestos insulation
component.
Solmon thus calculates the dollar amount of asbestos-
containing insulation used in shipbuilding as the product of
total naval shipbuilding expenditures times 0.0048. Thus:
(asb. ins. used in shipbuilding) = 0.0048 X (ttl. shipbuilding exp.)
3. Determining 0-I's Market Share at Brooklyn Navy
Yard
Professor Solmon thus laid the foundation for his ulti-
mate determination of 0-I's market share at the Brooklyn
Navy Yard. He next sought to calculate the dollar amount of
the asbestos insulation used at the Brooklyn Navy Yard over
the years. In arriving at such amounts, Professor Solmon mul-
tiplied the percentage of naval activity occurring at the Navy
Yard, based on numbers of employees, by the amount of as-
bestos insulation used in shipbuilding. Thus:
(asb. ins. at BNY) = (% nay. act. at BNY) X (asb. ins. used in shipbuilding)
Accordingly, the erroneous assumptions upon which
Solmon based his figures for the above multiplier and multi-
plicand, which have been detailed, derivatively impair the cal-
culation of the product - the amount of asbestos insulation
used at the Navy Yard - rendering such product similarly
suspect and arguably lacking in reliability.
The end of Professor Solmon's formula is the derivation
237. Hunt Affidavit, supra note 216, at 2(b) ("There is no rational basis for
comparison among typical cargo ships and warships .... ).
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of the following ratio:
(0-I at BNY)
(0-I mkt. share at BNY) =
(asb. ins. at BNY)
The denominator having been resolved, as shown, Solmon
then calculated the numerator - the amount of 0-I's asbes-
tos-containing products that reached the Brooklyn Navy Yard
- based on various sales records or summaries of sales
records that had been maintained by Owens-Illinois.2" How-
ever, these sales records and summaries were never estab-
lished as complete or accurate. Indeed, it is improbable that
records purporting to document corporate sales activities dur-
ing prior decades could, under normal circumstances, be
proven accurate or complete, even where authentic documen-
tation is extant and not reduced to summary form.
As a further matter, Professor Solmon limited his inquiry
to those records indicating direct sales to the Navy Yard.2 39 In
so doing, Solmon did not include or make any provision for
sales of Kaylo to dealers or distributors, who may, in turn,
have shipped to the Brooklyn Navy Yard.240 Because the as-
bestos industry was, in fact, filled with middlemen and dis-
tributors as an ordinary part of the asbestos marketing
scene,2 ,41 Solmon's assumption of only direct sales represents
an unwarranted leap of faith. It is therefore more likely than
not that substantial amounts of Kaylo were sold to private
distributors, which in turn supplied the 0-I asbestos products
to government yards.
The significance of Professor Solmon's assumption of di-
rect sales only is that, to the extent that indirect sales were in
fact made, the amount of Kaylo reaching the Brooklyn Navy
238. Second Solmon Deposition, supra note 218, at 7.
239. Id. at 8.
240. Id. at 58.
241. See, e.g., Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 (1989). See generally In re School Asbestos
Litig. 789 F.2d 996 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Kelly, 921 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1623 (1991); White v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1989);
Simon v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1988); Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 895 (1985).
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Yard would be undervalued. Any undervaluation of 0-I sales
to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, of course, will function as a fur-
ther device for devaluing 0-I's market share at the Navy
Yard.
As a quantitative matter, the numerous assumptions that
have been discussed result in the final assessments made by
Professor Solmon's econometric model, that 0-I's market
share at the Brooklyn Navy Yard for all but three years be-
tween 1943 and 1958 was less than 1% and in no year was
greater than 3.06%. These figures therefore contradict the
substantial anecdotal recollection on the part of numerous
former Brooklyn Navy Yard workers that 0-I's Kaylo consti-
tuted a significant portion of all insulation products seen at
the Navy Yard. 42
C. The In Limine Ruling Excluding Professor Solmon's
Testimony
At the in limine hearing held on December 4, 1990, in the
Brooklyn Navy Yard litigation, Judge Weinstein ruled that,
for a number of reasons, the testimony of Professor Solmon
would be excluded.2 4 In respect to this determination pursu-
ant to Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge
Weinstein stated that "the testimony would be given in con-
tradiction to Rule 703[, which] requires that the facts . . . and
data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference must be of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences. ''1 44
Judge Weinstein further found that an economist under-
taking a study similar to that attempted by Professor Solmon
would not reasonably "rely upon a telephone call without
written report of an architect whose background he has not
242. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
243. Transcript of Hearing on Motions Before the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein,
In re New York Asbestos Litigation (Brooklyn Navy Yard), CV 90-9999, at 7876
(E.D. & S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing].
244. Id. at 7876-77.
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checked upon.'245 The court also emphasized that, "for an ex-
pert to extrapolate from a chart such as was provided here...
based upon civilian ships of the period 1930 as compared to
the ships that were being worked on in the Navy Yard,
namely, heavy battle ships and heavy cruisers and large air-
craft carriers, represents such a departure from what would be
expected from an expert working in this field that it is unac-
ceptable. In fact, I find it shocking. '2 46
Finally, Judge Weinstein acknowledged, "I have a good
deal of respect for this witness' background, he has a fine cur-
riculum vitae[,] but I believe that by testifying as he has with
respect to this matter he has seriously compromised his pro-
fessional standing in this court, whatever any other court may
find. 247 At the conclusion of the in limine hearing, Judge
Weinstein directed that a transcript of the examination of
Professor Solmon be forwarded to the American Economic
Association "for analysis by that association, if it sees fit to do
so, to determine whether this level of expert testimony is ap-
propriate in a federal court of law. 's48
IV. Toward an Intermediate Approach to Proposed Expert
Testimony
The ruling by Judge Weinstein excluding the proposed
market share testimony of Professor Solmon represents an ex-
tension of the restrictive approach to contexts not involving
medical causation. While comporting with the letter of Rule
703 in determining that the data underlying Professor
245. Id. at 7877.
246. Id. Judge Weinstein also based his ruling excluding Professor Solmon's pro-
posed testimony upon Rules 702 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In respect
to Rule 702, the court stated that, "while this witness has specialized [and] technical
knowledge none of it offered here will assist this trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. Addressing Rule 403 considerations, the
court noted that the proffered expert testimony "provides such limited probative
value and such a high probability of prejudice as to warrant exclusion under 403
grounds as well." Id.
247. Id. at 7878.
248. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 243. The court later withdrew this
directive, and such a determination was not made by the American Economic
Association.
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Solmon's model is not the type of information upon which a
market share economist would reasonably rely, the court did
not inquire whether, as a factual matter,, this was so. Indeed,
it was only as an afterthought that the court directed submis-
sions to the American Economic Association for just such a
Rule 703 recommendation from an association of Professor
Solmon's peers.
Nor did the court credit Professor Solmon's attestations
that he had used "generally accepted principal[s] of econom-
ics," and had relied "upon information that economists nor-
mally rely upon to make this kind of evaluation."24 Similarly
to no avail was Solmon's suggestion that, because his underly-
ing data was, in this particular case, the best available evi-
dence for apprising market conduct undertaken several de-
cades ago, the economist would normally use, rather than
ignore, such data.' 50 Instead, Judge Weinstein relied upon his
own rigorous examination of the proffered testimony, as
presented through the plaintiffs' in limine motion, and found
that such testimony did not meet his own standard of reason-
able reliability.
In contrast to Judge Weinstein's approach, it is likely
that a court adopting the pure liberal approach to the admis-
sibility of proposed expert testimony would have concluded
that Professor Solmon's testimony was admissible. There is at
least some basis for Solmon's expert conclusions, and
Solmon's attestations, that in the practice of his profession he
would rely on the data underlying his model, which provides a
sufficient basis for satisfying the threshold criteria of Rule
703. 51 It is not clear, however, whether such a court adopting
249. Testimony of Lewis C. Solmon, In re New York Asbestos Litigation (Brook-
lyn Navy Yard), CV 90-9999, Transcript at 7819-20 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1990).
Professor Solmon further stated of his methodology that "[tihis is a set of economic
techniques that are standard and very familiar to me and I have, as I said, won
awards because I do it well." Id. at 7869.
250. See id., at 7837 ("as a quantitative economic historian[, w]hat we do is just
look at .. .any possible source of information that we can get. We evaluate - then
we evaluate the quality of whatever the data is and weigh it"); First Solmon Deposi-
tion, supra note 213, at 114.
251. In his deposition testimony, Professor Solmon revealed that he had first
given market share testimony on behalf of Owens-Illinois in 1981, and had similarly
1992]
63
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the liberal approach and finding the market share evidence
admissible under Rule 703, would then, nevertheless, find the
same evidence problematic under another provision of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, such as Rule 403.
In other words, the question arises whether the court
adopting the liberal approach should, in appropriate circum-
stances, exclude under Rule 403 that which it includes under
Rule 703. The immediate dilemma inherent in the suggestion
of such a bifurcated approach to the scrutiny of expert testi-
mony is that the creature of individualized judicial analysis
sought to be avoided under the liberal approach could never-
theless rear its disheveled head under Rule 403 analysis. Yet
Rule 703 certainly does not preempt or negate any other Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence. Logically, therefore, each Rule contin-
ues to play a role in the determination of admissibility, even
where expert testimony is at issue.
One argument in support of the restrictive interpretation
of Rule 703 is that, if rigorous judicial examination of prof-
fered expert opinion testimony must be undertaken pursuant
to Rule 403 in any event, then there is no reason to preclude
such examination under Rule 703. Comparison of the case law
representing the liberal and restrictive approaches, however,
suggests that the former approach more clearly comports with
the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence and ensures
greater consistency and clarity of judicial analysis on the issue
of admissibility.
Yet satisfaction of the liberal standard should result only
in a rebuttable presumption, and not a guarantee, of admissi-
bility of the challenged evidence. This presumption may be
overcome upon demonstrating, under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, that the probative value of the proposed
testimony is "substantially outweighed" by the danger of con-
testified on numerous occasions during the subsequent decade. First Deposition,
supra note 213, at 45-46. In his trial testimony, Solmon further explained that he has
"testified in other courts throughout the United States as an expert in the field of
economics," and, in particular, has testified "with regard to the market share of
Kaylo in the Brooklyn Navy Yard." Testimony of Lewis C. Solmon, In re New York
Asbestos Litigation (Brooklyn Navy Yard), CV 90-9999, Transcript at 7867, 7872
(E.D. & S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1990).
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fusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Isolated instances,
even if numerous, of potentially misleading or incorrect as-
sumptions should not by themselves warrant exclusion of the
evidence. Instead, this danger, of misleading the jury or con-
fusing the issues, must permeate the proffered evidence and
inhere in systematically misleading or flawed assumptions
that are substantially likely to thwart the jury's understand-
ing or determination of the facts in issue.
Consequently, the standard proposed here is, in effect, an
intermediate standard because it does entail a second level of
scrutiny of proffered expert testimony. However, the ability
ultimately to exclude such evidence is limited. Unlike the re-
strictive approach, this independent judicial examination oc-
curs in the context of the Rule 403 standard, and not to gauge
reliability under Rule 703. The Rule 403 analysis is different
from a rigorous Rule 703 examination. Accordingly, under this
intermediate standard, expert testimony that satisfies the lib-
eral standard, and is not, when viewed as an organic whole,
substantially likely to confuse the issues or mislead the jury,
will be admitted, even if such testimony does not fulfill the
court's particular standard of reliability.
A. The Correctness of the Liberal Approach
As an initial matter, the conflict between the liberal and
restrictive interpretations of Rule 703 should be resolved in
favor of the liberal approach. Rule 703 must be construed
against the backdrop of Rule 702, which prescribes generally
that expert testimony is admissible if the witness is qualified
and if the testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... "252 Thus,
whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert
testimony is a function of whether such testimony will assist
the trier. It follows that expert opinions are broadly admissi-
ble for purposes of Rule 702 unless they "are unhelpful and
therefore superfluous and a waste of time. '253
252. FED. R. EVID. 702.
253. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (quoting
JOHN H. WIGMORE, 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1918).
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Judge Higginbotham has addressed certain concerns that
arise from the openness to expert testimony apparently em-
bodied in Rule 702 and the Rules of Evidence, generally, in
respect to expert opinion testimony. He notes that, although
the Rules may be open to the criticism that they invite so-
called "hired gun" testimony, fears about the dangers of such
testimony originated well before 1975, when the Rules became
effective, and indeed well before 1965, when then Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren appointed an advisory committee to draft
such rules of evidence for the federal courts.26 Consequently,
it is reasonable to conclude that the advisory committee, and
then Congress, chose to tolerate the increased risks presented
by a liberalized approach to expert opinion testimony.
One response to such increased risks, however, is Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows the court
to appoint its own expert witnesses on its own motion or on
the motion of any party."' Though the argument has been
made that a court appointed expert may acquire an unwar-
ranted aura of infallibility, 256 such an appointment is, in ac-
tual experience, a relatively infrequent occurrence. Thus, it
has been noted that "the assumption may be made that the
availability of the procedure in itself decreases the need for
resorting to it. The ever-present possibility that the judge
may appoint an expert in a given case must inevitably exert a
sobering effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the
person utilizing his services. ' 257
Although the liberal approach makes more probable the
occasional admission into evidence of expert testimony having
questionable or negligible value, a corresponding risk associ-
ated with the restrictive approach is that valuable and funda-
mentally sound evidence will be excluded because the court
agrees with opposing expert testimony. One axiom rooted in
254. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168-69 (5th
Cir. 1989) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046
(1990).
255. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
256. Elwood S. Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony - Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q
416 (1961).
257. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 287.
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the liberal approach is that courts should not exclude expert
testimony on the basis of having chosen sides in the battle of
experts. The restrictive approach has been criticized because,
on occasion, it has resulted in such judicial alignment as a ba-
sis for decision making. For example, in Christophersen, the
district court had relied upon the affidavits of physicians who
disagreed with the analysis of the proffered expert, Dr. Miller,
who had concluded, "based upon reasonable medical
probability," that the decedent's illness and death had been
caused by exposure to fumes containing particles of nickel and
cadmium.258 In its first opinion, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Christophersen I overturned the district
court's determination, holding that the court "simply chose
sides in this battle of the experts and thereby usurped the role
of the jury in evaluating the evidence and the credibility of
expert witnesses."259
Certain decisions in cases involving the drug Bendectin
further illustrate use of a restrictive approach under which
admissibility becomes a function of the court's assessment of
the weight of competing expert views. In Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-MerreUI, Inc.,260 the court, citing In re "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation,261 concluded that the large num-
ber of epidemiological studies that failed to show a "statisti-
cally significant" association between Bendectin and birth de-
fects overwhelmingly outweighed contrary information
presented by the plaintiffs' expert, and therefore that the
proffered testimony lacked an adequate foundation."'2 In the
258. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Christophersen I"). See generally supra, notes 42-114 and accompanying text.
259. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 366.
260. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
261. See supra note 14.
262. 857 F.2d at 830, 831 n.59, 832; see supra note 118. Nevertheless, the Rich-
ardson Court recognized the rule in Ferebee that "courts should be very reluctant to
alter a jury's verdict [finding causation] when the causation issue is novel and
'stand[s] at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry.' If experts
are willing to testify to causation in such situations and their methodology is sound,
the jury's verdict should not be disturbed." 857 F.2d at 832 (emphasis in origi-
nal)(quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534). The Richardson Court distinguished Ferebee
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subsequent case of Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,2 63 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
plained that "[t]he Richardson court concluded, as a matter
of law, that the 'wealth of published epidemiological data...
none of which has concluded that the drug is teratogenic...
must be given their just due . . . .' Therefore, under Rule 703,
an opinion refuting this scientific consensus is inadmissible
for lack of an adequate foundation, in the absence of other
substantial probative evidence on which to base this
opinion. ' '1
64
Moreover, as related, in Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein
determined the reliability of various epidemiological studies
regarding the effects of the chemical, and found that those he
considered reliable and useful did not support the plaintiffs'
allegations of causation. Judge Weinstein found the studies
that did support a link between Agent Orange and plaintiffs'
illnesses to rest "on surmise and inapposite extrapolation
from animal studies and industrial accidents." ' 5 Although the
Agent Orange court apparently weighed competing methodol-
ogies as well as expert conclusions, the court took "judicial no-
tice" that the studies indicating or inferring causation derived
from unreliable underlying data and methodologies. 6' To the
extent that Judge Weinstein did weigh competing expert con-
clusions, he noted that Congress had linked only two diseases
to exposure to Agent Orange, but that neither of these dis-
eases afflicted the plaintiffs. 6 7
from the case before it by noting that, in the Bendectin context, we are at the other
end of the spectrum, a great distance from the "frontier of current medical and epi-
demiological inquiry." And far from a paucity of scientific information on the oft-
asserted claim of causal relationship of Bendectin and birth defects, the drug has
been extensively studied and a wealth of published epidemiological data has been
amassed, none of which has concluded that the drug is teratogenic.
Id.
263. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied., 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
264. Id. at 1162 (quoting Richardson, 857 F.2d at 832).
265. Agent Orange I1, 611 F. Supp. at 1231; see supra notes 120-124 and accom-
panying text.
266. Agent Orange I1, 611 F. Supp. at 1246; see supra notes 120-24 and accom-
panying text.
267. See Agent Orange III, 611 F. Supp. at 1237; cf. Helping Courts With Toxic
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However, it seems reasonable that, in terms of the ulti-
mate integrity of the fact-finding process, it is better to risk
admitting bad evidence under the liberal approach than to
risk the exclusion of good evidence under the restrictive inter-
pretation of Rule 703. This is because the exclusion of good
evidence permanently deprives the proponent of the opportu-
nity to make its case. The jury will not be presented with the
data, expert opinions or conclusions supporting the propo-
nent's position in the litigation. In contradistinction, however,
the admission of bad evidence will not prevent the opposing
party from thoroughly discrediting such evidence during
cross-examination. The jury, under such circumstances, is
thus presented with both sides of the issue and, as arbiter of
credibility, is left to credit or reject the expert testimony.
Establishing the reliability of expert conclusions should
not be a requisite to the admissibility of those conclusions,
but rather should be a concern inherent in presenting the evi-
dence to the jury. As stressed in Ferebee, the test for deter-
mining whether evidence reaches the jury "is not scientific
certainty but legal sufficiency."' 68 Accordingly, "the fact that
another jury might reach the opposite conclusion or that sci-
ence would require more evidence before conclusively consid-
ering the ... question resolved is irrelevant." '269 Once the pro-
spective witness is qualified as an expert in the field, then his
own assessment of reliability must be factored into the admis-
sibility determination, and may even be dispositive. If there is
some factual basis for the testimony, and if the methodology
and underlying data are of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field, the court, in excluding the evi-
dence under the restrictive approach, often necessarily substi-
tutes its own scientific or technical assessment for that of the
expert, and its own determination of the credibility of com-
peting views for that of the jury.
The analysis of the Third Circuit in In Re Japanese
Torts, supra note 30, at 56 (discussing the incorrectness of Judge Weinstein's ap-
proach and conclusions).
268. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
269. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation captures the essence
and intended meaning of Rule 703. As related, the Third Cir-
cuit emphasized that "[tihe proper inquiry is not what the
court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant disci-
pline deem it to be. '2 70 The court further noted that the lan-
guage and intent of Rule 703 require only "a factual inquiry
and finding as to what data experts in the field find
reliable." '271
Although courts and scholars recognizing such a limited
judicial role under Rule 703 have stressed that the prospective
witness himself should be deemed competent to judge the reli-
ability of his data and methodology, it is not clear that Rule
703 would preclude a collateral hearing on the issue of reason-
able reliance by experts in the field. Such a collateral proceed-
ing, however, could easily result in the kind of judicial weigh-
ing of competing views that the liberal approach seeks to
avoid. In any event, it is likely that the Rule contemplates
that validation of the underlying data by the proposed wit-
ness, who himself relies and thus stakes his professional credi-
bility upon such data, "ought to suffice for judicial pur-
poses." '272 Thus, it has been stated that, if the proffered
statements "'are attested by the expert as the basis for a
judgment upon which he would act in the practice of his pro-
fession, it seems that they should ordinarily be a sufficient ba-
sis even standing alone for his direct expression of profes-
sional opinion on the stand .... 273
B. Rebutting the Presumption of Admissibility
Yet satisfaction of the liberal standard should result only
in a rebuttable presumption, and not a guarantee, of admissi-
bility of the challenged evidence. Rules of evidence exist
270. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 276 (citing Wilder Enter. v. Allied Artists
Pictures, 632 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1980); Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d
1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979)).
271. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 277.
272. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283.
273. Japanese Antitrust, 723 F.2d at 277 (quoting CHARLES TILFORD MCCoR-
MICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15, at 35-36 (2d ed. 1972)); see supra note 183.
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outside of Article VII of the Federal Rules, which deals exclu-
sively with expert testimony, that may independently counsel
exclusion even where Article VII standards have been met.
Thus, the presumption of admissibility may be overcome
upon demonstrating, for instance, under Rule 403 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, that the probative value of the pro-
posed testimony is "substantially outweighed" by the danger
of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. To reconcile
Rule 403 with Rule 703, as construed under the liberal ap-
proach, however, this danger must permeate the proffered evi-
dence and inhere in systematically misleading or flawed as-
sumptions that are substantially likely to thwart the jury's
understanding or determination of a fact in issue.
Consequently, the standard at which we ultimately arrive
is, in effect, an intermediate standard because it allows a sec-
ond level of scrutiny of proffered expert testimony. However,
under this standard, the court has only limited ability to ex-
clude such evidence. Unlike the restrictive approach, this in-
dependent judicial examination occurs in the context of the
Rule 403 standard, and not to gauge reliability under Rule
703. Accordingly, expert testimony that satisfies the liberal in-
terpretation of Rule 703 and is not substantially likely to con-
fuse the issues or mislead the jury, will be admitted, even if
such testimony does not fulfill the court's particular standard
of reliability.
Rule 403 states that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.12 4 Circumstances are foreseeable in which proposed
expert evidence will be deemed admissible under the liberal
interpretation of Rule 703, yet problematic under Rule 403
because the evidence may potentially mislead the jury or con-
fuse the issues.
The proffered testimony of Professor Solmon in the
274. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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Brooklyn Navy Yard asbestos litigation arguably exemplifies
expert evidence that should fulfill the liberal standard, yet be
excluded under the second, intermediate level of scrutiny pur-
suant to Rule 403. Misleading assumptions within Solmon's
market share model, fully explicated above, threaten to con-
fuse the issues or mislead the jury.27 5
Nevertheless, even numerous misleading assumptions
should not be sufficient to exclude expert testimony under
Rule 403 that has been admitted under Rule 703. Such as-
sumptions, it is submitted, once shown to be specious, must
be both pervasive and systematic. Logically, to be systematic,
the network of assumptions must form or constitute a system.
The principal test of whether a chain of specious assumptions
forms a system is whether, taken as a whole, it is clearly ap-
parent that such a chain fosters a particular outcome.
Whether that outcome is consciously or merely inadvertently
fostered is irrelevant. The important consideration is that the
vast majority of the assumptions are conducive of one result.
Thus, under the intermediate standard, were the defects
in Professor Solmon's assumptions to operate in favor of each
party at apparent random, then exclusion of the expert testi-
mony under Rule 403 would not be appropriate. Thus, the in-
termediate standard permits the generally qualified expert
whose proposed testimony has some factual basis to offer such
testimony, even if his present analysis is demonstrably half-
baked or ultimately of negligible value, so long as the defects
are not result-oriented. If such evidence is determined to be
admissible under Rule 703, and under Article VII of the Rules
of Evidence generally, then it has already been determined
that the evidence is not "so 'fundamentally unsupported' that
[it] would be of no assistance to the jury in reaching a verdict.
The questions [the opposing parties] raise concerning the ba-
ses for the conclusions are issues properly presented to and
considered by the jury, but they do not render the opinion
unreliable and therefore inadmissible. 276
If the specious nature of the assumptions operate to pro-
275. See supra notes 165-193 and accompanying text.
276. Christophersen I, supra note 13, at 367.
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duce or to discourage a particular result that is material to the
litigation, however, then the danger that the expert evidence
may mislead the jury or confuse the issues is intensified, and
the proffered testimony should be excluded. When assump-
tions in an expert's methodology or analysis are both flawed
and systematically produce a skewing effect in favor of one
party, then the result, however unintentional, is analogous to
the commission of a fraud upon the court. As stated by the
dissent in the opinion in Christophersen II, the unfair
prejudice to which Rule 403 refers is "an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis. 27 7 When such a skew-
ing effect is demonstrated, the heightened protection offered
by Rule 403 becomes applicable, and the Rule thus acquires a
sort of policing function.
Of course, the fact that the expert's ultimate conclusion
favors the party proffering the evidence would not by itself
render such evidence sufficiently misleading under Rule 403
as to warrant exclusion. Because, as a practical matter, the
expert's conclusions will always favor the proponent of the
testimony, such a condition would render meaningless the re-
quirement of systematic speciousness. Here, the underlying
assumptions must be misleading, and must individually and
systematically mislead in such a way as to the tilt the expert
conclusions (and, by extension, the attentive jury) in one
party's favor.
It is arguable that the flawed assumptions made by Pro-
fessor Solmon constitute a system favoring Owens-Illinois, the
former manufacturer of asbestos-containing products and the
proponent of Solmon's testimony.278 The flaws permeating the
formula appear to work in a consistent way to devalue the
market share of Owens-Illinois at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
Each assumption that devalues O-I's market share thereby
277. Christophersen II, supra note 89, at 1106, 1135 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note 56 F.R.D. 183, 218).
278. Nevertheless, Professor Solmon has stated that, in making certain of his
market share assumptions, he "tr[ies] to bias the estimate, the calculation, against
Owens-Illinois." Testimony of Lewis C. Solmon, In re New York Asbestos Litigation
(Brooklyn Naval Shipyard Consolidated Cases), CV 90 9999, Transcript at 7823 (E.D.
& S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1990). See, e.g., Supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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operates to assist that defendant in minimizing its own re-
sponsibility for the plaintiffs' injuries caused by exposure to
asbestos products in the Navy Yard. Whether intentional or
not, the defective assumptions are both pervasive and
systematic.
Consequently, it is possible, as the in limine movants ar-
gued, that the problematic nature of Professor Solmon's
model rises to the level at which his proffered testimony is
properly excludable under Rule 403, even though such testi-
mony may be admissible under the liberal interpretation of
Rule 703. Although it may, therefore, be the case that even a
court adopting the liberal approach to proposed expert testi-
mony might have excluded Professor Solmon's testimony
under Rule 703, exclusion on this basis would not have frus-
trated the asbestos defendants' efforts at market share strat-
egy. For an economic analysis may be remedied of such sys-
tematic defects.
However, the reliability of any market share model set
forth in defense of an asbestos manufacturer will always be
problematic under the restrictive view of Rule 703. The need
to reconstruct marketing behavior and distribution patterns
occurring several decades in the past, for which there is mini-
mal authentic documentation, makes it highly unlikely that a
court adopting the restrictive approach would find such an ec-
onomic model to be sufficiently reliable to be presented to the
jury. Thus, Judge Weinstein's rigorous scrutiny of Professor
Solmon's proffered testimony signified a momentous obstacle
and possibly an end to the market share defense strategy in
the asbestos litigation, as well as an overall extension of the
restrictive view of Rule 703 to economic areas of environmen-
tal tort litigation.
V. Conclusion
Judge Weinstein's ruling excluding the testimony of Pro-
fessor Solmon in the Brooklyn Navy Yard asbestos litigation
suggests the broadened applicability of the restrictive judicial
approach to Rule 703 evaluation of proposed expert testi-
mony. In his Agent Orange opinions, Judge Weinstein com-
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prehensively set forth principles upon which he based his own
rigorous scrutiny of proffered expert evidence in the context
of medical causation. As courts have been guided by these
leading opinions, it is foreseeable that Judge Weinstein's use
of the restrictive approach in respect to proposed economic
evidence will now foster heightened judicial scrutiny of expert
testimony apart from the localized context of causation in the
toxic tort setting.
The ruling will further reinforce the already widespread
disinclination to allow market share evidence in asbestos-re-
lated litigation. This disinclination exists because market
share theories generally fail to account for the fact that the
toxicity of asbestos-containing products varies depending on
the specific nature of the asbestos component. Unlike DES,
for example, which was produced according to one formula
and for which market share theory may therefore be more ap-
propriate, asbestos products may contain one or more types of
asbestos silicates, as well as varying proportions of asbestos
fibers. Given this possible effect of the exclusion of Professor
Solmon's testimony, it is ironic that Judge Weinstein himself
is becoming a leading proponent of the use of the market
share allocation of responsibility in asbestos cases to relieve
the massive asbestos docket and streamline the litigation.
For asbestos defendants, the exclusion of the market
share testimony potentially negates one major defense that
might otherwise have been increasingly developed by the indi-
vidual companies. Because of the difficulty of constructing a
market share model of conduct that occurred several decades
in the past, and of which authentic documentation is truly
scarce, it is unlikely that any court using the restrictive ap-
proach will deem such evidence reliable enough to be
presented to a jury. Accordingly, it is probable that defend-
ants will continue to coalesce around defenses involving issues
such as state of the art and medical causation, rather than
splinter in the attempt to blame one another through market
share formulae.
It has been demonstrated, in any event, that these ana-
lytic and strategic concerns are informed by the larger doctri-
nal split, currently splintering courts involved in environmen-
19921
75
474 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
tal tort litigation, regarding the level of judicial scrutiny that
is appropriate under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. This article has argued for a liberal interpretation of
Rule 703, yet one tempered by a certain degree of heightened
scrutiny outside the confines of Article VII of the Rules of Ev-
idence. The resulting intermediate standard would counsel ex-
clusion of testimony such as that proffered by Professor
S01mon, but, unlike the restrictive approach, would disallow
exclusion of proposed testimony merely because such evidence
does not fulfill the court's individual standard of reliability.
Instead, once expert testimony is deemed admissible under
the liberal approach, it would be excludable under Rule 403
only if the defects in the proffered evidence are both pervasive
and systematic, and for these reasons substantially likely to
mislead the jury or confuse the issues.
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